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ABSTRACT 
Political culture, fiscal constraints and institutional incentives have shaped the making and 
implementation of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) in Latin America. However, why have 
CCTs consolidated in Brazil, been secondary in Colombia and remained absent in Venezuela? 
Brazilian authoritarian legacy and neoliberal rationality combined with strong federalism during 
economic downturn and provided room for experimentation in social policy, eventually leading 
to the incorporation and future universalization of CCTs (Bolsa Família). In contrast, less 
rationalized bureaucracies in Colombia and Venezuela have operated under strong 
presidentialism, allowing economic recessions and executive electoral incentives to shape weak 
CCT implementation (Familias en Acción) and the emergence of community-based alternatives 
(Misiones). This thesis advances a cultural framework based on these countries’ political 
histories that accounts for variability in type and time of implementation of anti-poverty policies. 
The project concludes that although political economy structures states’ bureaucratic fields and 
policy ideas, policy choices and their subsequent development are ultimately dependent upon 
regime contention and the cultural meaning of rights.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Regional Background and Policy Puzzles 
 
Most official policy models that strive to eradicate poverty in Latin America 
conceptualize poverty as an individual condition that can be fixed through multiple mechanisms 
of social assistance. In the quest to end the precarious situation of millions of people in rural and 
urban areas, states have used monetary transfers to ameliorate poverty levels since the 1990s. In 
fact, the leading social policy in the region is known as Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs), 
whereby states design specific strategies to reach target populations (usually those “at risk” who 
may be living in extreme poverty and remain within “poverty traps”) and provide them with 
money on the condition that individuals engage in behaviors that can improve their own lives at 
the same time that they raise national productivity indexes. While some states generally set up 
these conditions, requiring people to send their children to school, attend health services or 
purchase certain foods, other states construct anti-poverty policies without such conditionality.  
Poverty, however, is not necessarily an individual condition but rather a function of the 
way states structure their macroeconomic policies, their bureaucratic institutions and their 
political systems. Similarly, although social policies may at first seem like the result of the 
political actors that institute them, policymaking is the culmination of a series of events that 
trigger particular types of policies (i.e. universal, community-based or assistance-oriented). In 
fact, the objects of analysis in this study are three distinct social policies: Bolsa Família (Family 
Grant) in Brazil, Misiones (Missions) in Venezuela and Famílias en Acción (Families in Action) 
in Colombia. While Bolsa Família is a universal conditional cash transfer policy, the Misiones 
initiatives are non-conditional community-based strategies targeting poor communities, and 
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Familias en Acción is also a conditional transfer policy but it is not universal (instead, it targets 
selected populations and is assistance-oriented). Thus, the puzzle is two-folded: (1) why have 
governments in Brazil and Colombia embraced CCTs as the major anti-poverty strategy while 
Venezuela deviated from the regional pattern by establishing analogous (yet, non-conditional and 
community-based) programs? In answering this question this project also aims to develop a 
theoretical framework that combines the literature in Latin American comparative politics with 
institutionalist sociological perspectives on social policy ruptures and continuities. Thus, the 
project also examines (2) why CCTs become universal and based on citizenship rights in certain 
states (Brazil), while they remain marginal and relief focused in others (Colombia), and yet why 
they may never fully develop in other states (Venezuela).  
Through ideographic accounts for each country case, and historical-tracing methodology 
of policy development with an emphasis on politics and governmental institutions, this thesis 
seeks to establish comparative ground with which to understand why nations embrace and 
expand CCTs while others deviate from the trend. In particular, the project provides three 
distinct explanations for why CCTs have consolidated in Brazil, been secondary in Colombia 
and remained absent in Venezuela. Yet, despite differences in narratives, each explanation uses 
the same analytical variables: political culture, institutional incentives and fiscal constraints. This 
approach will demonstrate that national political histories have determined poverty definitions 
and the way states respond to objective poverty measures, sometimes by relying on the cash 
nexus and other times by setting up alternative community-based initiatives. The remaining of 
the introduction explains technical definitions for each policy and situates the research question 
in regional and historical contexts. 
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Conditional Cash Transfer Programs 
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs have shown increasing popularity in Latin 
America, allegedly due their innovative design as tools to attack long-term poverty. These 
programs make payments conditional upon school attendance and participation in health care—
thereby focusing on children and women—in the belief that immediate relief can also attack the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty. By providing families directly with cash, governments 
have sought to improve the synergies between education, health and other sectors. However, 
these programs have evolved and been implemented differently across Latin American countries. 
 The 1980s decade demonstrated an almost uniform move towards market deregulation 
and increased competition in Latin American countries. Through economic stabilization and 
structural adjustment programs, governments expected to stimulate growth as they engaged in 
policies that aimed to dismantle the state’s machinery, privatize public provisions and cut public 
spending, especially in the social sectors (Hall 2006).  This process helped to destroy much of 
the social protection infrastructure in the region, which was already regressive and embodied a 
non-redistributive welfare state (Hall 2006, Bastagli 2009). As such, governments in the 1990s 
sought to react to the adverse social and economic impacts caused by structural adjustment, such 
as mass poverty. Nonetheless, the will to alleviate these consequences did not translate into 
universalistic policies, partially because welfare structures have followed a corporatist and 
regressive modeli and because governments, seeing themselves as developing countries, have 
dismissed universal benefits as too expensive (Hall 2006). Accordingly, “Conditional Cash 
Transfers have come to represent an opportunity for countries to address the policy gap where 
formal social protection has been traditionally absent” (Bastagli 2009, 17). 
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Conditional Cash Transfer programs are increasingly regarded as a major social policy 
instrument in Mexico (Progresa, previously known as Oportunidades), Colombia (Familias en 
Acción), Chile (Subsidio Unitario Familiar), Nicaragua (Red de Protección Social), Argentina 
(Jefes de Hogar), Ecuador (Bono de Desarrollo Humano) and Brazil (Bolsa Família). The 
unifying characteristic of these programs is their moral and technical logic: 
The underlying principle is that human capital can be enhanced as a development 
vehicle by providing money to families to persuade them to invest in themselves 
through greater participation in education and health services. The technical 
rationale is that, by focusing on children, long-term human capital accumulation 
can help break the inter-generational trans-mission of poverty. Through 
stimulating effective demand for social services, it is also designed to counter the 
shortcomings of supply-side interventions such as schools and clinics that often 
do not reach the poor (Hall 2006, 693). 
However, specific program characteristics vary in practice in each country, such as transfer 
amounts and coverage, targeting mechanisms, conditionalities and institutional configurations 
(Bastagali 2009). Programs’ primary motivations are also an important defining characteristic. 
For instance, Chile launched its CCT programs in order to integrate the very poorest—which 
were falling under an existing safety net—into a national social protection system. On the other 
hand, Mexico’s main goal was to promote human capital accumulation among the poor so as to 
reduce their risk of being excluded from access to basic education and health (Bastagali 2009, 5). 
The Brazilian CCT (Bolsa Família) is a distinguished case because it incorporated the 
underlying principle of universalism, which largely explains its outstanding coverage rate and 
reduction in moderate and extreme poverty indexes. Finally, Colombia introduced CCTs as 
compensatory measures that targeted the poor, who had been affected by periods of adjustment, 
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and labeled the policy Familias en Acción. Following is an overview of the latter two programs’ 
trajectories and policy technicalities. 
 Bolsa Família is an anti-poverty policy with a relatively new political history, but one that 
exemplifies how social programs are the culmination of broader institutional inertias. The 
comparative politics literature usually begins the story when Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC, 
1995-2002) developed localized initiatives designed to provide for families’ needs in the early 
1990s. Initially thought of as a Minimum Income Guarantee (PGRM), the program evolved into 
Bolsa Escola (School Grant) in 2001 and provided mothers with a monthly stipend in return for 
their children attending school at least 85 percent of the time (Hall 2006). However, FHC’s 
Bolsa Escola worked through a quota system that limited the amount of families that could 
receive the grant. Given that mayors had full authority to appoint the members of the local 
councils that controlled the dispensation of these cash grants, “[f]requent manipulation of these 
councils and general confusion about the process of beneficiary selection led to a resource 
‘leakage’ rate of up to 36 percent”ii (Ansell 2011, 25). In such a context, the Lula administration 
(2003-2010) universalized, integrated and made the program’s distribution more transparent.iii  
 Given the complexities inherited from the FHC legacy, the Lula administration introduced 
major changes that improved the policy’s efficacy and its implementation transparency. First, 
Bolsa Família now targeted extremely poor and moderately poor families, meaning that Lula’s 
cash grant included a broader swath of the working poor than those of his predecessor—by 2006 
Bolsa Família had already reduced extreme poverty in Brazil by 19 percent and moderate 
poverty by 12 percent (Ansell 2011, 24). Second, Lula created the Ministry of Food Security and 
Fight Against Hunger, which tackled the challenge of local political interests in grant 
distributions. In fact, minister José Graziano created an alternative distribution network in which 
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he substituted food stamps with credit card style food cards so as to reduce the grants’ 
vulnerability to incorrect use (Hall 2006). Third, Lula’s administration appealed to supermarket 
chains that sought to build a new sense of corporate social responsibility and alliance between 
public and private sectors—over one hundred companies became involved in the scheme (Hall 
2006, 695). Finally, most important change to consider for this project, was the unification of 
preexisting CCTs in 2003: 
Although providing benefits to roughly the same target population, [the 
fragmented CCT programs] were difficult to administer, each scheme having its 
own bureaucratic structure, data collection, fiduciary responsibilities and 
reporting systems. Not only was this fragmentation costly [but it] sacrificed 
potential benefits in terms of synergies and complementarities at the family level 
in schooling, health and nutrition. By contrast, integration has helped reduce 
administrative costs, improve targeting efficiency, standardize procedures and 
results indicators and coordinate federal with state level safety net programs (Hall 
2006, 697).    
Yet, although Bolsa Família’s evolution demonstrates Lula and the Labor Party’s (PT) 
role in the improvement and unification of Brazilian CCTs, the program’s 
universalization did not necessarily follow from unification. In fact, because politics or 
political contention are insufficient to account for institutionalized policies that become a 
nation’s dominant strategy (Dobbin 1994), Bolsa Família’s genealogy raises questions 
about the governmental, legal and cultural structures that allowed its massive expansion 
in coverage—such matters are addressed in Chapter 2. 
 The Colombian CCT tells a different story and is usually narrated from a public policy 
perspective that prioritizes technical definitions over social science causal explanations. The 
dominant literature starts by describing Colombia’s economic crisis between 1996 and 1999, 
which caused a decline in GDP of 4.3 percent and a 3.5 percent increase in the public sector 
deficit (IDB and Colombian Government 2000/2007). Accounts also highlight that the 
unemployment rate doubled between 1994 and 1999, urban poverty increased 7 percentage 
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points between 1995 and1999, and many Colombians experienced forced displacement, internal 
conflict, violence and insecurity (Ramirez 2002). In terms of policymaking, technical sources 
also show how the government created the Social Solidarity Net (SSN) in 2000 and put forward 
a series of subprograms to mitigate the impact of the crisis on “the most vulnerable and poor 
citizens.” This new initiative covered several axes, such as poverty, unemployment, low school 
attendance rates and nutritional deficiencies. To address all these challenges, the presidency 
envisioned three subprogramsiv, from which the family support subprogram was the only CCT 
(Familias en Acción). 
Prior to the economic crisis, the World Bank (2002b) reports, many of the efforts to 
consolidate social solidarity nets in Colombia were narrow, temporary and lacked the resources 
that could allow their continuity (IDB and Colombian Government 2000/2007). The programs 
also failed to provide an integrated policy properly articulated with other, previously existing 
regional programs. As such, the new SSN aimed to address these discontinuities by establishing 
nationwide programs that tackled the various “exacerbators” of poverty. In addition, the 
Administrative Department of the Presidency wrote in the SSN’s Program decree in 1999 that 
Colombia was experiencing problems of public security that combined with a marked decline in 
the pace of economic growth, a sharp decrease in unemployment, and deterioration in the public 
accountsv. Such context, the document argues, motivated governmental action to initiate a set of 
programs targeting the poorest population in the country—specifically, the lowest two income 
deciles. In sum, policy reports argue that the presidency originally designed Familias en Acción 
to reduce the recently exacerbated poverty in the country. The program’s main objective, as 
stated in governmental reports and policy memos written in conjunction with the World Bank, 
the IMF and the IDB, aimed to institutionalize mechanisms to support and encourage investment 
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in human capital. In particular, given Colombia’s lack of strategies guaranteeing minimum 
family incomes during emergencies, the SSN aimed to reverse the economic recession’s negative 
consequences between 2001 and 2004vi.   
 Most importantly, Familias en Acción differs in content and form from Brazilian Bolsa 
Família or the Venezuelan Misiones. In terms of content, the family subprogram is a reactionary 
form of policy that did not originate with the commitment to eliminate poverty but to 
compensate for its exacerbation after the crisis. In form, Familias en Acción started as a fully 
foreign-funded program. The World Bank and the IDB, through collaboration and intermediation 
of the Presidency and the Investment Fund for Peace (FIP), provided $270 million for the whole 
program and $98.4 million for the CCT in particular. This is why Colombia offers a crucial case 
study for exploring the multiple conditions that allow CCTs to develop in the region. 
Furthermore, as will become evident in Chapter 4, these conditions are not only tied to political 
institutions but are also fundamentally conditioned by legal and cultural processes within the 
bureaucratic apparatus. In fact, these processes also account for the absence of CCTs in 
Venezuela, to which this introduction now turns.    
 The Misiones initiatives in Venezuela are analogous strategies to CCTs because they 
target the same basic needs that are said to exacerbate people’s accumulation of disadvantages 
that lead to poverty (Sen 2000).  While CCTs like Bolsa Família provide food distribution, 
access to high school education and health services on a conditional basis, Misiones have the 
same goal but lack the conditional attribute. For example, Misión Ribas targets health provision 
and originally used alliances with Cuban doctors, Misión Sucre provides registration and 
stipends to students to access middle and secondary education and Misión Mercal takes care of 
improving food distribution mechanisms. However, these projects are not conditional because 
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they are distributed on a community-by-community basis and target collectivities rather than 
individuals. As such, the rigorous distribution mechanisms present in other states are lacking (e.g. 
Cadastro Único in brazil or the mediaiton of the Beneficiary Identification and Selection System 
(SISBEN) in Colombia). Furthermore, the available literature on the programs (mostly 
government-produced or -associated) prioritizes ideological justifications over policy impact 
evaluations. 
 As reported by D’Elia and Cabezas (2008), the 2004 President of PDVSA stated, 
“the Misiones are the seed of new institutionalism; against the great obstacle of the 
bureaucratic state, inefficient and ineffective.” As such, in ideological terms, the 
Misiones constitute parallel structures to the state, seeking to prepare the conditions to 
substitute an inherited “bureaucratic” state for a “revolutionary” one. Moreover, after 
winning the elections in 2006 and in defense of the 2007 constitutional reform, Chávez 
explicitly claimed his will to consolidate the Misiones and prioritize the collective social 
self over individualized notions of progress and development. Under this framework 
Chávez advocated moving beyond capitalist social relations, as “manifested in the 
imposition of minority interests over the interests of the originary power, the 
concentration of property in few hands [and] the political difficulty to democratize 
power;” moreover, the president emphasized the need to overcome “an institutionalism 
that prioritizes the establishment of a sheltered bureaucratic ideological superstructure 
that keeps our people chained to misery, alienated and distanced form their own reality” 
(Cabezas 2008). Indeed, the Venezuelan case exposes an anti-technocratic sentiment at 
the center of political power that raises questions about the material roots of such an 
ideological stance. Accordingly, Chapter 4 will reveal the ways in which political 
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upheaval since the 1980s led to the emergence of an anti-poverty policy model that 
deviates from the conditional transfer norm.  
 
Understanding Larger National Histories 
The first step to understand variation in policy choices across country cases is to 
understand each state’s background in terms of political economy. In fact, Brazilian, Colombian 
and Venezuelan politico-economic histories have been discontinuous—i.e. authoritarian and 
recently democratic, or vice versa, formerly protectionist and currently neoliberal. Yet, the 
timing, the individual motivations and the structural outcomes of these events diverge. First, in 
the political realm, Brazil experienced a military dictatorship lasting nineteen years (1964-1985) 
until the advent of democracy in 1985 slowly began to change national power configurations, 
while in Colombia and Venezuela elitist two-party systems maintained a mild from of 
bureaucratic authoritarianism for most of the twentieth century—especially during the National 
Front period (1958-1974) in Colombia and since 1958 when Rómulo Betancourt became 
Venezuela’s first popularly elected president. Yet, Myers and Dietz (2002) attribute the 
diverging Venezuelan experience to unprecedented oil revenues enabling democratic political 
leaders to make progress in modernizing the country and resisting the regional wave of 
authoritarianism of the time.vii These differences point at three kinds of state formation legacies 
that include: an authoritarian past, a semi-democratic tradition and an oil-funded democratic 
system. Moreover, understanding political legacies requires close examination of the economic 
circumstances that conditioned these institutional outcomes.  
Economic policy trends followed the same logic in the three countries, but not the same 
timing. Latin American scholars highlight the fact that despite a general acceptance of Import 
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Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in the region, timing and country-specific approaches to ISI 
had different institutional impacts (Mesa-Lago 1994; Gill 2005; Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Haggard 
and Kaufman 2008). Most importantly, this thesis proposes that considering elements of 
economic activity and foreign relations embedded in perspectives of political economy allows 
social policy scholars to understand the transformations within state bureaucracies, which 
ultimately design and implement anti-poverty strategies—whether CCTs or not. 
In the Brazilian case, federalism had given “institutional expression to an underlying 
political reality: the prior existence of regional political identities that transcended and checked 
all earlier attempts at unitary rule”(Myers and Dietz 2002, 300). In particular, “regional political 
elites have vied for control of the national government through the use of political clienteles and 
personalist ties” and centered the balance of power in the state and not the federal government. 
This produced an institutional legacy in which the efficiency of government became dependent 
on the cooperation of the landed oligarchy (Carvalho 1974 in Evans 1995, 62). This legacy 
intersected the military regime’s era and ISI, creating a system of patronage and personalized 
relationships between bureaucrats and industrialists (Evans 1995). By the mid 1980s, Brazilian 
institutions faced more structural challenges than democratization ideology could anticipate, and 
coincided with the economic consequences of the unsustainable “miracle” resulting from 
authoritarianism and ISI protectionism. Such trajectory in Brazilian political economy proved 
detrimental when inflation levels struck the nation. These two elements, regional political elites 
competing for control over national government after dictatorship and governmental priority 
over macroeconomic stability, allowed CCTs to emerge in Brazil and unfold the programs’ path 
toward universal social policy. Accordingly, Chapter 2 interrogates the multiple dynamics in 
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governmental administration of both, technocratic rule designing policy, as well as the role of 
strong federalism in the consolidation and unification of the Bolsa Família CCT.  
Venezuela, on the other hand, is a petro-state. While other Latin American states faced 
the challenges of landlord-peasant disputes after the demise of agricultural products in the late 
1950s, oil eased Venezuelan elites and masses into urban life (Karl 1997, 101) at the same time 
that it created long lasting effects in the country’s bureaucratic apparatus. Specifically, “[w]hat 
differentiated [Venezuelan] democracy from its counterparts was its prolonged ‘positive sum 
game,’ which was due to its fiscal reliance on petro-dollars—an often plentiful, often erratic, and 
always vulnerable revenue source”—that placed an especially high premium on gaining access to 
the state (Karl 1997, 104). As such, the sources of revenue structurally conditioned a patronage-
oriented political system and subsequent economic instability (due to the recurring financial 
bonanzas that cause rampant inflation). Yet, because the causes and processes of political 
deterioration after 1970s due to this rent seeking cycle have been documented elsewhere (Karl 
1997, 138-60), Chapter 3 develops the analysis from the collapse of Venezuela’s two-party 
system (puntofijismo), and concentrates on more contemporary political ruptures and contesting 
ideological discourses. As such, the chapter pays special attention to the constitutional 
amendments and reconfigurations of executive and parliamentary powers toward the end of the 
twentieth century. In other words, although Chapter 3 takes into account the structural 
foundations of petro-states, which condition states’ bureaucratic fields, it primarily aims to offer 
an ideographic account of recent political history. Namely, to explain why CCTs remained 
absent in Venezuela, but share analogous programs under the Misiones, it is necessary to 
examine recent legal and cultural transformations in politics. Therefore, while Chapter 3 
comments on the country’s dependency on oil revenues and their historical role in shaping 
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national development, it argues that socio-legal and cultural analyses are necessary to explain 
contemporary implementation of social policies.     
Finally, in Colombia, political decentralization occurred before the demise of ISI and the 
country experienced a relatively good economy in the 1980s. Never suffering from a debt crisis, 
Colombia’s protectionist policy continued to exist until the 1990s (Myers and Dietz 2002). 
Hence, Colombia circumvented authoritarianism,viii maintained a relatively stable democracy 
despite late liberalization of the economy and a profoundly elitist and bipartisan political culture 
(Myers and Dietz 2002). This stability, however, relied on repression of rural voices and 
cooptation of urban movements (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 48-49). In other words, although 
considered semi-democratic, by the 1990s Colombia faced challenges structurally comparable to 
those of authoritarian repression, such as the resilience of drug gangs, guerillas and 
paramilitaries threatening the security of electoral politics (Myers and Dietz 2002).ix This context 
shaped a national government oriented toward state consolidation and securitization strategies, 
simultaneously influencing design in anti-poverty policies. As explained in Chapter 4, when an 
economic recession challenged the country’s stability in 1996, the presidential office responded 
with a temporary and assistance-oriented anti-poverty policy in part due to the national emphasis 
on security and recovering the ability to govern nation-wide. Again, cultural analysis will 
contribute to synthesizing the legacies of political economy with contemporary policymaking—
i.e. relief-oriented CCT development. 
In summary, each country’s historical context reveals how political institutions have 
interacted with economic policy and the effect that these policies have, in turn, had on state 
consolidation and democratization processes. The impact of ISI had diverging effects in the three 
countries primarily because of differences in the way formal political institutions where set up 
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and how they intersected with economic circumstances, which in turn shaped future decision-
making. It is clear that Brazil's military dictatorship and individualized ties with the bureaucracy 
and business actors generated high levels of industrialization at the expense of an economic crisis 
in the mid-1980s. Similarly, the Venezuelan government used the revenues from petroleum sales 
to sustain a democratic system but failed to accommodate the population's needs at the end of the 
century, which led to an on-going transformation that has taken revenues closer to the people but 
undermined liberal democratic practices. In Colombia, repressing the rural and urban dissidence 
through political elitism proved effective in maintaining the country economically and politically 
stable despite generating alternative challenges to democratization, such as rural dissidence and 
revolutionary movements.  In short, political economy perspectives account for country’s 
bureaucratic formations because they highlight the sources of state resources, but such views 
necessitate socio-legal and cultural explanations to fully account for variation in contemporary 
policymaking. Skocpol and Amenta (1986) labeled these mechanisms "policy feedbacks," 
whereby "the causes of policy origins are not necessarily the same as the causes of the 
subsequent development of policies, in part because policies themselves transform politics." 
To understand how larger national histories influenced anti-poverty policymaking in the 
1990s, the following chapters analyze each case’s 1) institutional incentives, 2) fiscal constraints, 
and 3) political cultures. First, institutional incentives refer to how formal political structures 
(Federal vs. Unitary) generate structural or electoral motives for innovation, implementation and 
deployment of anti-poverty policies. Second, fiscal constraints are a function of the economic 
environment and the way funding is locked within the bureaucratic apparatus (Haggard and 
Kaufman 2008), and financial considerations are contrasting preferences over the sources of 
funding (i.e. reliance on foreign banking institutions because of their expertise or because 
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policies have a temporary design (Colombia)). Lastly, political culture refers to the way national 
legacies have constructed the way ‘problems are perceived and solutions conceived’ (Dobbin 
1994) within bureaucratic fields (Bourdieu 1994) that create cultural meanings about the 
relationship between the populace and the state. As such, the following chapter summarizes 
theories and methodological traditions in institutionalist sociology and political science on Latin 
America in order to understand anti-poverty policies through a socio-legal and cultural 
framework.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Political Institutions and the Cultural Meaning of Anti-Poverty Policies  
 Comparative and historical scholars are not often content with explaining a large part of 
the variation in their cases but they often want to explain it all (Amenta in Janoski 2005:109).  
This section acknowledges the extensive and intensive character of this kind of research by 
providing an overview of the major orientations and methodological issues on the study of policy 
initiatives. This literature review presents the multiple theoretical perspectives on how to answer 
questions of variability in social policy across multiple country cases. The section begins with a 
review of state-centered theories and its major contributions, followed by major premises in 
political institutional theory and debates around national culture and institutional incentives. 
Next, the section addresses traditional approaches in political science to the “study”x of Latin 
America and their prioritized methods, in order to emphasize their relevance but highlight their 
ultimate shortcomings. Finally, by foreshadowing this study’s analytical variables (political 
culture, institutional incentives, fiscal constraints), the chapter ends with a cultural model 
applicable to the three South American cases.  
State-centered theory is crucial in understanding the development of social policy in 
South America because it provides a methodological framework with the tools needed to 
advance case-specific causal claims. Orloff and Skocpol (1984) first used this approach in 
answering why Britain adopted social insurance programs much earlier than the United States 
despite the similarities among the countries. The authors claimed that two specific processes of 
state formation influenced this outcome: democratization and bureaucratization. In particular, 
because the United States had democratized before it bureaucratized, it produced a state with low 
bureaucratic capacities that oriented political parties toward patronage rather than social policy 
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programs. Thus, these patronage-oriented political parties used state positions as sources of 
employment simultaneously eschewing social programs. As such, Orloff and Skocpol 
constructed a causal explanation that showed how state and political organizations operated, and 
how they would, in turn, have an impact on policy proposals directly or indirectly (by 
influencing what politically active groups proposed). As such, processes of state formation are 
key in exploring the impact of political legacies on the emergence of anti-poverty policies. 
Specifically, the way a history of military regimes (Brazil) compares to two-party systems 
(Colombia and Venezuela) in the creation and evolution of state capabilities.    
Although the study of social policy has always been at the heart of political sociology and 
politics, state-centered theory failed to account for all relevant causal processes. In particular, 
since the early 1980s state-centered theory advanced the idea that state building influenced 
politics directly and indirectly (eg. by channeling political activities in some ways rather than 
others) (Skocpol 1985, in Evans et al., 1985). This meant that studying state structures would 
reveal states’ influence on political actors and their identities, as well as their impact on the 
actions of politically mobilized groups and the resulting outcomes. However, the study of 
politically organized groups was left undertheorized. Thus, political-institutional theory emerged 
to fill this void and explain the construction of large-scale political institutions, such as political 
party systems.  
Within political institutional theory, some scholars advance structural and systemic 
arguments, where long-lasting political institutions influence all groups and the outcomes of 
interest within a country or category. This approach is sometimes referred to as a national 
political culture. Dobbin (1994) posed the question of why railways had been developed under 
the private sector in Britain, a private-public hybrid in the United States and fully state-
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controlled in France. Dobbin’s main causal premise was that “policy-making begins when 
nations identify collective problems that demand public solutions” (206). As such, he argued that 
in the course of railway development, these countries identified entirely different sorts of 
problems: Britain saw the concentration of the industry as a problem that demanded government 
action, whereas France saw inadequate concentration and coordination as a problem for the state 
to address. This perspective is useful for the study of social policy in South America because it 
places policymaking within a ‘problems perceived, solutions conceived’ logic. In analyzing anti-
poverty social policy in the three countries, this framework helps contextualize why Brazil and 
Colombia perceived poverty as a problem that could be addressed through conditional cash 
transfers, whereas Venezuela tackled poverty issues with a model of radical-democratic 
community-based programs.    
Nonetheless, claims to a ‘national culture’ explaining why countries choose some policy 
solutions and not others are theoretically and substantively incomplete. Prasad (2005) claims that 
the 'national culture' explanation is unsatisfactory because it ignores the presence of 
contradictory cultural trends, conflict and struggle, and often-vital subcultures within each state. 
Furthermore, Prasad states that the national culture argument also ignores the presence of 
cultural diffusion across national boundaries and the fact that cultural concepts are malleable and 
can usually be interpreted in multiple ways (380). Accordingly, this study uses Dobbin’s 
inferences that infrastructural developments (eg. railway, bureaucratic capacity) have a long 
lasting influence on subsequent political decisions but adds an additional explanatory variable. 
While national political culture explains type of antipoverty policy in South America, 
institutional incentives providing opportunities for technocrats and politicians to innovate in 
social policy explain timing (Prasad 2006). 
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 Studies on institutional structures and their influence in policymaking provide a very 
helpful theoretical framework to understanding the development of anti-poverty initiatives in 
Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. Prasad (2006) sought to explain the varying degrees of success 
that Neoliberal economic policies have had in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. 
In particular, she studied the processes that led to large neoliberal changes in policy-making in 
the United States and the UK while none or small change in France and West Germany. Prasad’s 
theoretical framework argues that institutions are central to social and policy change because 
they structure the incentives of actors in ways that cannot be reduced to the social origins of the 
actors (i.e. Reagan and Thatcher in the Anglophone countries, or Lula, Chávez and Uribe in 
South America). Institutions also aggregate social preferences and pressures in ways that cannot 
be predicted from the strength of those preferences and pressures (i.e. strong neoliberal pressures 
in Germany did not necessarily result in large market-friendly policies). In relation to this study, 
conditional cash transfers are not reducible to the individuals who first proposed the policy or to 
the strength of neoliberal discourse within the three governments. Conversely, the emergence of 
the Misiones programs in Venezuela cannot be attributed to the government’s socialist ideology, 
and neither can the leftist party in office account for the expansion of CCTs in Brazil. Thus, 
rather than national culture or actor-centered explanations, this project uses the institutional 
framework to claim that institutional incentives are the source of innovation in social policy. 
 Political institutional analysis also focuses on historical processes that underscore the 
way actors interact at the interorganizational level of states. In early state-centered 
conceptualizations of policy choices, Skocpol (1986) argues that ‘policies themselves transform 
politics’ but Prasad’s (2006) more recent work empirically demonstrated that previous policies 
set up a structure of incentives and resources that has an independent causal effect on later 
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policies (i.e. corporatist decision-making structures in Germany conditioned the small effect of 
neoliberal rhetoric in that country in the 1980s). This set-up established the importance of using 
historical accounts on institutional structures to fully understand the development of social 
policies in comparative perspective. Therefore, this study examines how governmental 
institutions created the incentives to (1) universalize CCTs in Brazil, (2) create an oppositional 
model in Venezuela and (3) maintain CCTs as secondary initiatives in Colombia.  
 Amenta (in Janoski 2005, 109) notes that political institutionalists explain the differences 
in large patterns by showing that some structural and systemic political conditions or 
circumstances hindered a major development in one place and either aided or allowed the 
development in another. Accordingly, the political institutionalist framework combined with the 
comparative historical method of detailed causal argumentation at the organizational level is the 
best way to approach the following questions: Why did Brazil and Colombia introduce 
Conditional Cash Transfer programs while Venezuela envisioned a non-conditional, yet 
analogous model? Furthermore, why did Brazil frame anti-poverty policies as citizenship rights 
(universal policy) while Colombia kept these initiatives assistance-oriented? 
 Traditionally, scholars of Latin American nations have focused on the way national 
strategies in the world economy shape social policy and condition the development of welfare 
states—particularly the effects of economic growth and the logic of industrialism. As such, 
scholars using a neo-Marxian approach (e.g. class-struggle, accumulation and legitimation) 
would frame questions of divergence in social policy by analyzing comparative spending in 
social programs. This conceptualization, however, obscures the nuanced processes behind policy 
adoptions, which vary among states in timing, type and levels of spending. As shown above, this 
study’s central question necessitates an institutional theoretical framework because it seeks to 
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account for the political conditions that determine the origins, type, expansion and 
implementation of anti-poverty policies.  
 Recent and parsimonious studies have shed some light on case-specific processes of 
policy-making in Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. In an extensive comparative study between 
Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) argue that 
antipoverty policies in democratic countries are means to building support among new 
constituencies. For example, the Brazilian anti-poverty initiative Bolsa Família, since its origin 
in 1985, responded to the ruling party’s need to expand electoral support during democratic 
consolidation. Haggard and Kaufman also argue that antipoverty policies are not simply a 
reflection of economic growth, but that states’ fiscal circumstances and legacies, and the various 
partisan identities condition anti-poverty policies. Similarly, in explaining 
divergence/convergence in anti-poverty policy in South America, this study examines the role of 
political parties, academic centers, and bureaucratic personnel, as well as the financial 
constraints present in each state. In doing so, the study avoids treating policy outcomes in each 
country as merely state-induced or a mere reflection of economic growth; instead, it sees policies 
as the effect of internal interactions between the various political institutions within diverging 
macro-systems of cultural meaning and rational action; in other words, bureaucratic fields. 
 
Doxa, Bureaucratic Fields and Inference Methods 
 In explaining the genesis and structures of bureaucratic fields, Bourdieu (1994) argues 
that “the state does not necessarily have to give orders or to exercise physical coercion in order 
to produce an ordered social world, as long as it is capable of producing embodied cognitive 
structures that accord with objective structures” (15, my emphasis). Accordingly, the 
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ideographic accounts in the following chapters will demonstrate how states have dominated 
constituencies’ perceptions by establishing cognitive structures that transform social 
policymaking into symbols that legitimize the authority and ‘rational action’ of governmental 
incumbents.    
 While state-centered and political insititutionalist approaches have advanced and refined 
important theoretical conceptualizations and methodological orientations for the study of policy 
choices, these studies have only addressed issues within advanced economies such as the United 
States, Britain, France and Germany. Conversely, studies on Latin American countries have 
mostly framed research questions based on political economy (i.e. as outcomes determined by 
political structures and financial circumstances and legacies—Mesa-Lago 1994; Gill 2005; 
Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Haggard and Kaufman 2008), thus failing to incorporate cultural 
sociological insight. Moreover, these studies have ignored the historical processes and 
institutional backgrounds that make those policies conceivable and the reasons behind 
convergence/divergence in type and extent of implementation. In light of such a scholarly divide, 
Diagram 1 presents a synthetizing theoretical framework. 
 Considerations in political economy, such as economic activity and foreign relations, are 
the material foundations that shape diverging bureaucratic fields (Historical Legacies, panel A). 
Each field will construct a different cultural meaning of the relationship between the populace 
and the state as well as the political party’s relationship toward technocracy (Legal environment, 
panel B). However, the legacies of state formation also shape the role of lawyers and academics 
in how they influence the content of law and policy ideas, respectively (e.g. Constitutional 
amendments and CCT innovations). Thus, the convergence of cultural ideas, the dominant 
party’s ideology and the state’s socio-legal basis generate an operative matrix that determines 
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anti-poverty policies (Policymaking, panel C). This matrix’s output can be explored through the 
examination of states’ (1) political cultures, (2) institutional incentives and (3) fiscal constraints 
since the 1990s. 
 
 Diagram 1. Policy Development within Bureaucratic 
Fields
 
 
 Methodologically speaking, to avoid immateriality in cultural arguments, the research 
provides events in national politics and examples of institutional transformations. Specifically, 
by adhering to Bourdieusian sociological theory, the following chapters trace the social, political 
and institutional origins and actors that construct national Doxas: 
 “Doxa is a particular point of view, the point of view of the dominant, when it 
presents and imposes itself as a universal point of view—the point of view of those 
Historical	  Legacies	  |___________________(A)___________________|	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Legal	  Environment	  |_________(B)________|	   	  	  	  	  Policymaking	  |_____(C)______|	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who dominate by dominating the state and who have constituted their point of 
view as universal by constituting the state (Bourdieu 1994, 15).   
Accordingly, by establishing the various bureaucratic fields in each country case, chapters will 
demonstrate how presidential, party and congressional configurations established cognitive 
structures that symbolically legitimized (1) an increasing role of the state and the law in 
Brazilian social policymaking, (2) triggered disillusionment with technocratic rule in Venezuela, 
and (3) shaped executive unsupervised autonomy in Colombia.  
 The sources of evidence are primary documents (journalistic sources, legislation, 
contracts and public government documents). In particular, these pieces are used to show how 
public policy administrators and intellectuals first articulated the idea of Conditional Cash 
Transfers, and how they linked to the background and influences of policymaking institutions 
explored in secondary socio-legal sources for Brazil and political culture for Venezuela. For the 
Colombian case, sources are primarily journalistic and legislative, with support from secondary 
scholarship that contextualizes the moment but does not necessarily address CCT development. 
The distribution of sources is approximately half for U.S.-based scholars and the other half for 
academics in each country case. Accordingly, the author translated texts in Portuguese or 
Spanish and synthesized policy reports with social science texts.  
 
Legacies	  of	  State	  Formation	  and	  Political	  Culture	  	  
Legacies of state formation in the twentieth century defined variation in how 
governments envisioned social policies. As such, looking at infrastructural and intellectual 
developments is likely to provide insight on the question of how each country’s political culture 
relates to the type and implementation of social policies. In Brazil, this study finds that long-
lasting authoritarianism created a strong state with a large infrastructural capacity, and that the 
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permeation of neoliberal economics and political science advanced a form of rationality that 
influenced the way social policy makers viewed poverty and intelligible ways to fight against it. 
In Colombia, rationality has meant militarism and programs centered on security, nation building 
and pacification. In such a context, anti-poverty policy remained marginal and originated as part 
of a supplementary effort to compensate for poverty exacerbation and not its structural roots. 
Venezuela’s rentier state has conditioned weak infrastructural and institutional capacities. Oil-
economy legacies have impacted the subsequent development of political institutions so that by 
the end of the twentieth century Venezuelan politics had turned upside down, generating new 
ideological currents within the executive and facilitating innovation in anti-poverty strategies.  
  In the Brazilian case of Bolsa Família, Chapter 2 draws on Dezalay and Garth (2002) to 
trace the way transformations within the military regime made the ruling class compete to 
become part of the state—in particular, the way these changes incentivized elites to draw on 
foreign expertise and made them shift investments to the United States. Among other influences, 
the chapter shows how the 1969 Ford Foundation grant to the Brazilian Center for Analysis and 
Planning expanded social science funding but implied a close emulation and legitimation of 
U.S.-based and Cold War policies. Subsequently, the section uses connects the new orthodoxy in 
the United States with the ideological productions of the World Bank in the 1980s to frame 
Brazil’s institutional culture as informed by “new economics and political science.” In particular, 
these “new disciplines” aligned with Chicago-style neoliberalism while highlighting the role of 
institutions and the primacy of technocracies. In other words, the chapter frames Brazilian 
political culture as influenced by how U.S. knowledge centers reconceived political science, 
based on monetarist and rational choice theory, as well as celebrated the role of technopols in 
national administrations.  
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 In the Venezuelan case, political culture can be summarized as disillusionment with 
neoliberal policy-making. Multiple factors combined at the end of the 1980s decade that 
precipitated a reconfiguration of power and made evident the need for a political and economic 
transformation. Contreras (2004) succinctly summarized this context in six factors: (1) rising 
inflation; (2) macroeconomic instability; (3) generalized corruption; (4) declining wages and 
public services; (5) progressive internal and external indebtedness; and (6) weakening of the 
development model based on oil revenues (113). Such an environment placed the challenges of 
political legitimacy in direct conflict with the problems of economic rationality. Accordingly, 
using process-tracing methods to analyze political events in the last three decades, Chapter 3 
explains why Venezuelan institutions have been extremely volatile and prevented the emergence 
of neoliberal social policy projects—CCTs. Specifically, that Venezuela’s petro-state configured 
a bureaucratic field in which voting constituencies viewed technocracy in contradiction to 
national prosperity, thereby supporting an emerging radical socialist party.  
  For the Colombian experience, political culture refers to the government’s emphasis on 
internal defense and the recovery of national sovereignty lost to guerilla and paramilitary groups. 
Anti-drug trafficking agreements like ‘Plan Colombia’ in the mid-1990s and the ‘Democratic 
Security’ approach of the early 2000s advocating an iron-fist treatment to violence and illegality 
issues, best exemplify this militaristic culture. In relation to anti-poverty policy, Chapter 4 
explains how these defensive stances over governability meant that the president enjoyed 
avenues for policy implementation due to the crisis. Specifically, that economic recession and 
presidentialism influenced Colombia’s CCT from its foundation, which conditioned the policy as 
temporary and assistance-oriented.      
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Institutional Incentives Create Social Policy 
An important characteristic to explain variation in social policy across countries is the 
ability to account for the processes leading to their implementation at the meso-organizational 
level. Whereas political culture is a powerful argument following historical-institutionalist 
approaches, this study aims to complement such perspectives by ascribing central causal roles to 
political institutions (Amenta in Janoski et al. 2005). As such, the second variable under 
examination, institutional incentives, aims to expose the roles and influential degrees of state and 
party building processes, their impact on constitutional reforms and the way these changes 
generate electoral incentives for powerful actors. Therefore, the second variable aims to show 
how structures of government intersect the motives of state personnel and their pursuit of anti-
poverty policies.  
In the Brazilian case, strong federalism and continued popular support for the ruling party 
seemed to have been a major contributor to the evolution of CCTs, from isolated programs into a 
unified national system. On the contrary, in Venezuela the fragmentation of political parties and 
newly drafted constitutional mandates allowed reforms to take place without checks and balances. 
These circumstances unfolded in a series of incentives for social policy innovation that rejected 
the idea of ‘conditionality’ in cash transfer programs and preferred a form of holistic community 
development. Finally, the Colombian CCT’s original design, over which the president had 
discretionary power, became a tool for explicit campaigning and neopopulism. Accordingly, 
because this anti-poverty policy originated as temporary and focalized, the program’s expansion 
occurred without a revision of its structural components, clearly revealing that electoral 
incentives drove CCT development.    
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Fiscal Constraints and Financial Resources 
 Social policy is intrinsically bounded to the fiscal circumstances and legacies of the 
political institutions that make them possible. Beyond the obvious fact that states need financial 
resources to carry out anti-poverty policies, fiscal constraints also refer to the way national/local 
budgets are distributed and locked within political and bureaucratic systems. This consideration 
also engages, on a qualitative level, economic crises and historical fluctuations in financial 
capabilities to explain divergence in type and extent of anti-poverty policy implementation.  
 Brazilian anti-inflationary policies in the early 1990s and the government’s emphasis on 
macroeconomic stabilization have stimulated collaboration in Bolsa Família, because it was an 
effective way for municipalities to access fiscal resources. In particular, Beck (2009) suggests 
that it was the hardening of subnational budget constraints that gave new fiscal incentives for 
municipalities to collaborate with the federal government. Moreover, budget allocations and 
legal distribution of resources seemed to have been a major logistical requirement for CCT 
unification. Hence, this study will show how the evolution of CCTs was possible because budget 
configurations created room for experimentation at the local level; beyond that, how those 
conditions led to ultimate universalization.  
 In Venezuela, fiscal conservatism has lacked due to several years of economic boom 
from increasing oil revenues. Using historical analysis and inferences from renowned scholars in 
Venezuelan politics, this study will argue that financial flexibility and cash plenty have not 
forced the government to engage in neoliberal models of efficiency and rationalized 
infrastructural development of social programs—CCTs. In contrast, the Misiones, which are the 
comparative alternative to conditional anti-poverty strategies, have been funded by heightened 
oil prices and increased state control over oil revenues. This study shows how the government 
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has used a series of legal and political reconfigurations to access those revenues and design non-
traditional institutional ways to deploy social policy, such as the creation of new ministries and 
funds, or the use of national planning and budget. Thus, the final variable is intended to shed 
light on the ways fiscal circumstances and legacies provide territory for innovation in socially 
committed programs. 
 Colombia’s financial considerations relate to the 1996 economic crisis that exacerbated 
poverty and increased inequality indicators throughout the country. The financial observations 
also cover how the CCT Familias en Acción originated as fully funded by international banking 
institutions with a three-year end-goal and transitioned to a national public policy, fully state-
funded and with an open-end date. In this case, more than explaining the type of policy (whether 
CCT or not), financial considerations explain timing (early design in late 1990s and later 
expansion in 2006) and help support aforementioned arguments of electoral incentives, which 
gave the Colombian executive a reason to expand anti-poverty policy. 
 Table 1 is an overview of the specific variables within each state. The conclusion will 
present these variables in interaction with each other as exposed in Diagram 1. The final section 
will also engage in broader discussions over path dependency in anti-poverty policy, theoretical 
implications of rationality in policy-making and the tensions between focalized versus universal 
social provision. The last paragraphs explore possibilities for further research and comment on 
the need to understanding national economic policy as directly linked to design, implementation 
and effectiveness of social policies. 
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Table 1. Political-Institutionalist Variables on Social Policy Innovation 
 
 Political Culture Fiscal Constraints or 
Financial 
Considerations 
Structure of 
Government and 
Institutional 
Incentives 
Conditional 
Cash 
Transfer? 
 
Brazil 
 
U.S.-imported 
rationality and 
infrastructural 
capacity for 
technocratic rule 
 
Budget Allocation 
Anti-inflationary fiscal 
conservatism. 
 
Sources of Funding 
International banking 
organizations and state 
funds. 
 
 
Incentives 
(Structural) 
Strong federalism 
Regional elite 
competition 
Advent of 
democracy 
 
Universal 
CCTs 
Bolsa Familia 
 
Venezuela 
 
Disillusionment with 
economic 
rationality/ 
Extra-institutional 
approaches 
 
 
Sources of Funding 
Oil revenues channeled 
through newly created 
ministries and funds. 
 
Incentives (Electoral) 
Presidentialism 
Reconfiguration of 
constitutional 
mandates  
Referendums 
 
No CCTs 
Misiones 
 
Colombia 
 
Securitization 
priorities and 
“democratic 
security” platforms 
 
Sources of Funding 
International banking 
organizations (2001), 
some state (2006), fully 
state-funded (2010). 
 
 
Incentives (Electoral) 
Presidentialism 
Unsupervised policy 
proposals and 
implementation 
 
Assistentace-
oriented 
 CCT 
Familias en 
Acción 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Tracing Bolsa Família’s Genealogy: U.S. Rationality and Technocratic Rule in Brazil 
 The history of Conditional Cash Transfer programs in Brazil best defies the modern 
worldview on human and organizational behavior. While mainstream economics advances the 
idea that behavior is oriented to economic utility maximization, pluralist political science argues 
that the driving force behind human action are political struggles over collectivized material 
interests. A common thread in these two perspectives is the use of rational choice theory, in 
which decision-making is oriented toward the most cost-effective means to achieve a goal. In 
response, this chapter analyzes anti-poverty social policy in Brazil to contend that rationality is 
essentially a system of cultural meaning. This is because the idea of conditional transfers 
emerged from a specific socio-political context of institutional incentives and external academic 
influences and not spontaneously out of rational decision-making.  This chapter argues that the 
emergence and implementation of CCTs in Brazil do not reflect the program’s “inherent” 
economic efficiency or the success of a political party and their left-wing ideology. On the 
contrary, the creation of Bolsa Família resulted from the U.S. exporting a model of rationality 
that permeated the social sciences in Brazil. Within this institutionalization of rationality, 
innovation in social policy became possible during the economic downturn of the late 1990s, and 
strong federalism later allowed the Workers’ Party to unify and universalize Conditional Cash 
Transfer programs. 
 External influences have overwhelmingly conditioned poverty alleviation policy options 
in Latin America since the early 1970s. The World Bank has been most relevant in prescribing a 
three-fold approach to poverty alleviation: (1) macro- and micro-economic policies that support 
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overall economic growth and employment for low-skilled labor; (2) provisions of basic social 
services in the areas of public health care, family planning, nutrition and primary education; and 
(3) a program of well-targeted nets and transfers (World Bank, 1990a: 3; 1993a in Pitou van 
Djick in Centeno and Silva 1998). The prescription of structural adjustment programs has been 
most effective in Brazil in relation to the development of anti-poverty policies. How did 
Brazilian intellectuals become so dexterous in rational choice policymaking and imagined a form 
of social policy like Bolsa Família? The first half of this chapter explains how the legacies of a 
military state and the institutional permeation of the United States created a suitable environment 
for technocratic rule. Following, the chapter presents original writings from academics and 
policymakers who first formulated the idea of Conditional Cash Transfers.  Because nations 
almost never choose from the same sets of options, understanding the origins of options is crucial 
(Dobbin 1994:214) in order to account for their historical evolution and their eventual 
implementation. 
 The World Bank also views the subsidization of food and other necessities as potential 
heavy burdens on the government if the facilitating programs are not targeted effectively (Djick 
1998). Bolsa Família, however, was able to overcome errors (excessive coverage of people 
outside target group or failed coverage within group) and epitomized an effective and universal 
cash transfer program. What structural characteristics or contingent events allowed Brazil to 
universalize this kind of programs, as opposed to other alternatives and transform it into its social 
policy flagship? The second part of this essay pays special attention to the circumstances that 
allowed Fernando Henrique Cardoso to use the insights of CCT thinkers and experiment with 
their ideas, from the local to the national level. Next, the particularities of Brazil’s strong 
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federalism will account for the subsequent universalization of the programs under president Luis 
Inácio Lula da Silva.  
 
Institutionalization of Rationality 
 
Institutionalized ideas about what is rational develop at the societal level in concert with 
institutionalized ideas of what is fair, what it legal, what is legitimate and what is scientifically or 
technically possible (Edelman, 2004) in a specific context with its own norms, values, common 
sense and law (Conti, 2008). As such, to understand the rational use of conditional poverty 
policies in Brazil one must go back to the mid-century military regime, when the state began to 
consolidate its technocratic and externally informed base. Dezalay and Garth (2000, 97) argue 
that U.S. political science and economics developed in Brazil after the hardening of the military 
positions in the late 1960s, strongly tied to international opportunities made available after WWII. 
Specifically, that several institutions for teaching and policy-making emerged to bridge U.S.-
Brazilian academic and governmental efforts in the early 1950s. Among others, Dezalay and 
Garth mention (1) the War college and the Instituto Rio Branco, which included prominent 
veterans that participated in the conspiracy against the elected government in 1964; (2) the Joint 
Brazil-U.S. Comission for Economic Development which involved the World Bank and played a 
central role in setting the tone for Brazilian economic policies after the war, through figures like 
Roberto Campos and José Luis Bulhões Pedreira; (3) the creation of the BNDE (National Bank 
for Economic Development) and other large public utilities (Petrobras, Electrobras). 
 The U.S. administrative influence over national and technocratic institutions represented 
the systemic legitimation of economics as a policymaking tool.  For instance, the Comisión 
Económica para América Latina (Economic Comission for Latin América—CEPAL) was 
another academic center established by the United Nations to encourage new learning and 
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produce new students of development (Dezalay and Garth 2002, 98). The CEPAL’s ideas over 
development sometimes contrasted or gained dominance over the more orthodox economics of 
the War College or the Insitituto Rio Branco, but its presence contributed to the fact that “the 
debates between economic approaches helped to build the legitimacy and autonomy of 
economics as a discipline” (Dezalay and Garth 2002, 98). Given the rational-choice theory 
foundations of economics in the 1980s, the reification of rationality emerged from the struggle 
between competing groups and their “common sense” notions of legitimacy, fairness and other 
values and norms (Conti 2008,146; Weber 1947,124). 
 Multiple institutions and grants targeted the most important universities in cities like Rio 
de Janeiro and São Paulo. Not only was there an explosion of U.S. informed economics, but 
political science also became an increasingly U.S.-funded and -prescribed discipline. By the end 
of the 1960s, in the context of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, grants through the Ford and 
Rockefeller Foundations to CEBRAP (Centro Brasileiro de Analise e Planejamento) expanded 
social science funding, which was evidently attached to U.S. and Cold War policies. Whereas 
grants like those given to the CEBRAP helped institutions promote the ideas behind the 
transition to democracy, they also gave political prominence to the technocrats like Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso (Dezalay and Garth 2000, 104). Similarly, the U.S.-informed nature of 
economics and political science provided the academic and cultural background for policy 
designs. Specifically, emerging public intellectuals followed Durkheimian epistemology and 
empirical methodology to re-direct their social science research toward political practice, which 
involved a shift away from typical sociological themes—race relations, social stratification and 
cultural dynamics—to a political analysis of relationships between authoritarian regimes, social 
exclusion and economic models (Abu-El-Haj and Chilcote, 2011, 23). 
	   38	  
 By the mid-1970s, the CEBRAP had become an intellectual best seller advocating the 
idea that representative democracy called for a better income distribution, free labor unions and 
participatory social movements, and economic development (Abu-El-Haj and Chilcote, 2011, 
26). In particular, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, among many other public intellectuals, 
responded to the contemporary idea that political stability and economic growth would alleviate 
income concentration in the long run.xi  Their research demonstrated that “while authoritarian 
economic policies sacrificed income, social well-being and the future of the country, historical 
data showed the compatibility of economic growth, controllable inflation, and improvements in 
income periods of democracy (Abu-El-Haj and Chilcote, 2011, 26).  This configuration of 
intellectual debates and institutional elements supporting public scholarship would later make the 
idea of conditional poverty policy intelligible because they generated challenges against the 
technocratic rule established by the military dictatorship. In relation to the emergence of CCTs, 
situating the management of social issues in the hands of state officials, who were in turn 
informed by U.S.-based academic expertise, seemed to have been a major factor in the 
formulation of social policy and Bolsa Família’s subsequent development.  
 The story may be traced as back as 1975, when Antonio Maria de Silveira introduced the 
idea of a negative income tax—monetary transfers proportional to the difference between the 
minimum exemption level and the income earned by the poor person, taking a subsistence base 
line to fix the exemption level (Silva et al., 2004). Silveira was native from Ponte Nova in the 
state of Minas Gerais but became a student of administration and economics from the Graduate 
School of Industrial Administration at the Carnegie-Mellon University in the mid-1960s. In 
particular, Alan Meltzer, one of the major intellectuals of the monetarist school in the U.S., 
inspired Silveira’s work. However, upon his return to Brazil, Silveira focused his academic 
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research toward the “limitations involved in the application of economic theory to the reality and 
eradication of poverty” having discovered that much of the data used to produce econometric 
analysis had been falsified in 1973 by the military dictatorship (Lagrota Lopes 2007). Silveira 
taught Economics and Adsministration in several universities in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro 
and always advocated for a critical appraisal of the methodology informing policy choices and its 
philosophical implications. To illustrate, 
To those who argued that an unconditional minimum income disincentives work, 
Antonio argued, inspired by Herbert Simon, that human beings possess increasing 
aspirations. He even stated that using the homo-economicus model—according to 
which work generates disutility while preferences are given—to argue that a 
minimum income led to leisure was an example of the Ricardian Vice. In those 
instances, the philosopher and social reformer joined forces for the same cause. In 
his vision, the argument was based on a judgment against the poorest, given that 
other forms of income transfers, disassociated of effort (e.g. inheritance) are 
accepted by society without contestation (Lagrota Lopes 2007, my translation).  
Silveira’s work was indeed influential and derived from multiple perspectives emerging from 
monetarist formation and new insights in the philosophy of economics.   
 Silva et al. (2004) divide the evolution of CCTs in Brazil in four historical periods after 
Silveira had exposed the idea as a theoretical possibility. The first period corresponded to the 
systematization of CCTs in Brazilian public policy and dated back to the early 1990s, in which 
the program of Minimum Income Guarantees (Programa de Garantia de Renda Minima) was 
approved unanimously at the national level. Eduardo Suplicy (PT-SP) promoted this legislation 
(Law no 80/1991) and did so inspired by Silveira’s work and philosophical considerations. 
However, the conditionality concept in cash transfers was first articulated by Critovam Buarque 
in a paper published in 1987 in Brasília. In this document, Buarque suggested the government to 
provide scholarships to keep the poorest children in school through guarantees of a minimum 
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income to poor families, which would incidentally creative an incentive for these families to 
provide education to their children (Beck 2009, 110). Written by Senator Cristovam Buarque and 
other academics from the National University of Brasilia (UnB), the policy document called for a 
minimum income scheme linked to education titled “A Revolução nas Prioridades” (A 
Revolution in Priorities) and circulated in the early 1990s (finally published in 1994). As such, 
the origins of CCTs nurtured from ideas coming from multiple locations and as the result of joint 
efforts combining academic expertise and political action.  
 The second moment corresponds to the idea of cash transfers equivalent to a minimum 
wage for families with dependent children from 5-16 (1991) and 7-14 (1993) and focused on 
lower strata. This idea emerged from debates among Worker’s Party economists in Belo 
Horizonte in 1991 when José Márcio Camargo, next to Suplicy and Silveira, proposed that the 
minimum income program be started through families and related to their educational 
opportunities (Suplicy n.d.). These debates occurred through a series of articles in Folha de São 
Paulo by Economist José Márcio Camargo (12/26/91 and 03/28/03) which proposed the grant be 
targeted not to individuals but to poor families with children, conditional on school-age children 
enrolling in school and maintaining minimum school attendance (academic versions of this 
proposal were included in working papers by J. Camargo and H. Ferreira in 1994 and by J. 
Camargo and F. Ferreira in 2001) (Kathy Lindert 2007). 
 Moreover, although discussions over the intellectual ownership of CCTs are popular in 
journalistic sources and mass media representations of policymaking, it is crucial to analyze 
larger social structures and the constellation of incentives generated for these actors. In other 
words, discussing macro-social processes of state-formation reveal the importance of 
institutionalized rational action and the formation of the bureaucratic field in relation to anti-
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poverty commitments. As such, the fact that these debates over cash transfers conditioned on 
education were introduced in the early 1990s points us to investigate a broader conjuncture in 
Brazilian political history and nation-state consolidation: the 1988 Federal Constitution.  
 
Social Policy in the Context of Constitutional Reform 
 Nation-states present themselves as legitimate units of action internally (through 
constitutions) and externally (by seeking admission to the United Nations and other 
intergovernmental bodies); nation-states also claim to engage in rational actions, such as the use 
of policy technologies to achieve means-ends goals (Meyer et al. 1997, 154). In particular, 
national goals have become increasingly uniform, typically emphasizing national and equitable 
individual development, and stating these purposes through constitutions (Meyer et al. 1997, 
154). This is exactly what occurred in Brazil in the late 1980s and early 1990s: the government 
drafted a new constitution along the lines of rational actorhood and set development goals and 
welfare prescriptions of egalitarian citizenship within public discourse. For example, the Federal 
Constitution promulgated in 1988 institutionalized social assistance as a public policy through 
Title VIII (Articles 203-204). This reform brought a very important innovation: the institution of 
the “seguridade social.” This was a new Portuguese word created to express the concept of 
governmental social intervention, which had been incorporated in Brazil based on international 
experiences with welfare state models in several European countries. Accordingly, these 
frameworks aligned with the purposes of liberty and social justice that the Brazilian re-
democratization movement sought to embody, and helped to justify state authority by shifting the 
rhetoric toward a social-democratic model.  
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On the other hand, lawyers in Brazil had been the key group of actors advancing the 1988 
constitution from within legal institutions, but they employed the tools available from US-
imported economics and political science (Dezalay and Garth 2002). By the time of the 
constitutional redrafting, Brazilian institutions had institutionalized a U.S.-formulated 
understanding of rationality informed by the new orthodoxy in the United States in the 1980s 
that affected the World Bank but remained supportive of institutions’ roles —“new economics” 
aligned with Chicago-style neoliberalism. This combination made space for the state and the law 
to use U.S. knowledge centers that reconceived political science and celebrated the role of 
technopols in national administrations, who could promote a liberal democratic state.  
 The intellectual and institutional contexts explained above complemented each other in 
the mid-1990s and demonstrated incentives generated by two new systems: multi-party politics 
and decentralized democracy, which operated under the context of technocratic rule and 
permitted eventual CCT development. First, the relative novelty of multi-party politics in Brazil 
(1985-) incentivized parties to broaden their constituencies, where conditional transfer ideas 
were suitable mechanisms to do so. As such, the third moment in CCT development followed 
Silveira, Suplicy and Buarque’s ideas and took place in 1995 through experiences in Campinas 
in São Paulo—Riberão Preto--, and in Brasilia D.F. (two distinct Brazilian municipalities). 
Launched during the same week in January 1995, these two CCTs represented two different 
political parties. The Bolsa Escola program was launched by then Governor Cristovam Buarque 
(Workers Party, PT) in the Distrito Federal on January 3, 1995) and the “Guaranteed Minimum 
Family Income Program (PGRFM) was launched by then Mayor José Roberto Magalhães 
Teixeira (Brazilian Social Democratic Party, PSDB) in the Campinas Municipality on January 6, 
1995 (Kathy Lindert 2007).  
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 Second, democracy meant decentralization post-1988 as the constitution set up an 
“institutional framework of overlapping policy authority between three autonomous levels of 
government—federal, states and municipal” (Beck 2009). It also institutionalized social 
assistance as a public policy in Title VIII (Articles 203-204). However, after 1993 all 
governmental attention and public opinion focused on fighting an increasing and boundless 
inflation and on foreign debt issues, emphasizing economic growth and export-oriented policies, 
which left no space for the implementation of anti-poverty policies or income redistribution 
(Silva et al. 2004, 89). As such, one of the most interesting puzzles in Brazilian political history 
as it relates to social policy development is how CCT ideas articulated in the early 1990s 
transformed into a national comprehensive policy in a decade despite facing the challenges of 
strong federalism post-1988 decentralization. Specifically, the way the federal government, 
under FHC’s second mandate (1999-2002), took charge of programs and decentralized 
implementation and began the debates around whether CCTs had to represent a minimum income 
or a citizenship income. 
 
Fiscal Constraints and Bottom-Up Policy Models 
 In 1995, the government created the National Secretary of Social Assistance (SNAS), 
which changed the conceptualization of and experimentation with social protection policy. In 
particular, social inclusion was now framed as a social right, where social security and social 
assistance were means to an end and not as an end in itself. In other words, “[e]mbraced as a 
right, the regulation, production and operation of social protection policies were to be framed as 
public responsibilities” (Castro 2005, 25 in Beck 2009, 110). However, this institutional 
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framework only had an impact on CCT development after fiscal constraints at the federal level 
had been tamed.  
 Although based on the newly created framework of Social Protection under Cardoso, the 
government enjoyed six years of locally based experimentation (1995-2001) before the first 
national CCT became implemented. Rigid macroeconomic stabilization pushed Brazil into a 
period of critical uncertainty from external shocks that led to the currency’s eventual devaluation 
in 1999 and a subsequent decrease in household per capita income (FGV 2006 as cited in Beck 
2009:105). The decade long fiscal crisis began to be resolved between 1993 and 1994, following 
the implementation of a highly successful stabilization package called the “Real Plan.” 
Consequently, more conservative fiscal reforms began to emerge under the social-democratic 
party (PSDB) and were negotiated predominantly by its leader FHC during his second 
presidential term (1998-2002).   
 The programs in Campinas and Brasilia D.F. showed successful results with municipal 
CCTs to the extent that the federal government co-financed these programs. In 1998, the 
Government of President Cardoso launched the Program for a Guaranteed Minimum Income 
(PGRM), which the Ministry of Education managed and provided transfers to municipalities who 
were implementing CCTs but lacked sufficient resources to sustain such programs (Kathy 
Lindert 2007). The federal government gradually expanded the programs’ support, prioritizing 
the poorest municipalities and with the aim of covering all municipalities and the Federal District 
of Brasília. While municipalities had to contribute at least 50 percent of the financing to receive 
federal support for their cash transfer programs,  “the PGRM was not a conditional cash transfer 
program in and of itself, but rather a mechanism for providing financial support to municipalities 
to enable them to implement such programs” (Kathy Lindert 2007). As such, Cardoso’s six years 
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of locally based experimentation with social policy refer to the fact that the PGRM was integral 
in promoting and sustaining local level CCT initiatives at the same time that it served as a path 
toward future CCT federal programs. Specifically, because the Real Plan brought negative 
effects on the poorer segments of the Brazililan population, the central government would launch 
the first national noncontributory cash-transfer program in Brazil to address these short term 
externalities (Beck 2009:111). This new program maintained the name of the program in 
Brasilia—Bolsa Escola—pointing at the oddity that CCT implementation originated from locally 
based successful experiences and moved toward a comprehensive national project. 
 
Strong Federalism and the Advent of Democracy 
 
Institutional factors provided incentives for successful central-local collaboration 
in the social policy area, in particular in the implementation of Bolsa Família. Tracy 
Beck (2009) argues that “a non-majoritarian political system, the constitutional autonomy 
of municipalities, and the gradual hardening of post-1995 subnational budget constraints 
facilitated the ability of the central government to live up to the aspirations and 
expectations of the Brazilian public by combating hunger, poverty and misery through 
this program” (Beck 2009, 1). The PT’s rise to power interacted with Brazilian 
federalism so as to universalize Bolsa Família in 2006. In particular, the key to 
understanding this outcome lies on Beck’s use of the new political-insititutionalist or 
electoralist approach that asserts that decentralization (or recentralization) is a product of 
political incentives at all levels and their resultant political relationships (Montero and 
Samuels 2004, 20 as cited in Beck 2009). 
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 Given FHC’s hardening of budget constraints resulting from his administration’s 
attempt to stabilize macroeconomic performance, municipalities gained a new incentive 
to collaborate with the central government. Brazil is commonly characterized as a strong 
federal system in which government functions are distributed among three levels of 
government, where power is largely given to governors and subnational interests are 
articulated within the Brazilian National Congress (Beck 2009, 104). Beck highlights that 
the success of Bolsa Família is its ability to avoid powerful state-based governors. In her 
words, “as a redistributive social program that depends on central-local collaboration, 
Bolsa Família avoids the kind of negotiation between the executive and legislative 
branches that has come to epitomize Brazilian federal politics”(Beck 2009, 114). In 
particular, that “ a significant part of municipal revenues comes from federal earmarked 
grants allocated on their participation in centrally designed and financed social programs 
such as Bolsa Família” (Beck 2009, 117).  Such was the strength of this incentive, that 
one hundred percent of the municipalities adhered to this federal program by 2006, which 
facilitated the central government’s ability to deliver benefits to roughly 11 million 
families (Beck 2009, 122). 
The uniqueness of Bolsa Família lies behind its ability to have unified various CCTs that 
had been originally implemented by municipalities. It was a remarkable event because it 
demanded the synchronization and mutual cooperation of these micro-local governances with the 
larger states and the overall union. As such, a major centerpiece was the articulation of the three 
levels of government in which political innovations and partnerships could occur (i.e. negotiation 
possibilities and their structural context). In fact, municipal autonomy was first recognized by the 
Constituent Assembly of 1987-1988. The new constitution contained unclear policy 
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responsibilities that combined with soft budget constraints and allowed the twenty-seven states to 
shrink their responsibilities back onto the central government, creating a form of ’predatory 
federalism’ (Beck 2009, 108) Accordingly, the 1988 constitution had generated a system of 
federalism plagued by opportunism among three competing levels of government at the same 
time that it lacked a regulating and/or nationalized majority party. 
Overall, institutional incentives for CCT expansion in Brazil were structured by strong 
federalismxii. Beck (2009) argues that Bolsa Família was successful (i.e. provide more than 11 
million families in situations of social vulnerability federation-wide in fewer than three years 
(2003-2006)) because the policy was able to avoid powerful state-based governors. Beck 
explains that strong federalism has empowered local actors to hinder the efficacy of 
democratically elected governments at the center even before the process of democratization 
(Gibson 2004), and that política dos governadores (politics of governors) is a commonly used 
term to describe how governors used their power to control the election of deputies to the 
Brazilian National Congress and control the legislative agenda (Mainwaring 2004). As such, the 
intermediate level of federalism has been dominant in Brazil, allowing for the prioritization of 
subnational interests in congress. Most importantly, however, is the fact that the highly 
centralized federal structure (27 states have veto power and 5,564 municipalities have policy opt-
out privileges) includes open list electoral rules that motivate politicians to favor local and 
regional demands. As such, state-based federal deputies and governors have survived politically 
by being able to claim credit for successful policy outcomes (Ames 2001 as cited in Beck 2009).  
Beyond structural considerations, however, law and rational systems of social 
policymaking, such as prescriptions in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, contributed to CCT 
universalization. Constitution prescriptions were consolidated in the Organic Law of Social 
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Assistance (Lei No. 8.742, December 7, 1993) (Article 15 attributed the execution of all 
programs confronting poverty to the municipal level). In particular, Article 1 stated that social 
assistance and public transfers must guarantee self-realization to citizens. After 2000, this 
responsibility was legally enforceable through fiscal regulation imposed by the federal 
government (Article 15) (Beck 2009, 117). Beck writes: “the intended political effect of this 
conceptualization of social protection was to generate a direct relationship between the 
federation and the citizens in situations of vulnerability with as little intermediation as possible” 
(Beck 2009, 110).  
Anti-poverty policies at a national level are bound to face several organizational 
challenges, particularly in federal states where municipal execution must combine with 
administrative cost sharing and program monitoring to institutionalize initiatives along the 
multiple levels of government (Beck 2009, 113). As such, the constitutional autonomy of 
municipalities incentivized collaboration because the provision of basic health services and 
primary education falls primarily under their jurisdiction. Bolsa Família requires municipalities 
to be responsible for providing and coordinating these public services, for registering the targeted 
low-income families in their territory, and for establishing agreements between non-
governmental organizations and various local bodies in order to provide social control for the 
program (Beck 2009). 
Universalization, however, only occurred when these structural incentives intersected the 
hardening of subnational budget constraints, beginning in 1995 and culminating in the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law in 2000. The new law locked financial resources and created fiscal incentives 
for municipalities to collaborate with the federal government. In particular, “increasingly 
earmarked federal grants financed by federal revenue became necessary to finance provision of 
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subnational social services” (Rezende 2007 as cited in Beck 2009, 112). Thus, the hardening of 
budget constraints and the increasingly centralized regulation of subnational budgets provided an 
initial political incentive for municipalities to collaborate directly with the central government 
(Beck 2009). 
 
Continuity and Universalization of Anti-Poverty Strategies 
 
Dobbin (1994) argues that it is the socially constructed logics of state action, more than 
the organizational resources of states that persist to produce policy continuity. Moreover, that 
states regularly create new policy instruments that require organizational resources they do not 
hold, but they model those policies on the principles embodied by existing policies. This line of 
reasoning explains why the Brazilian Worker’s Party decided to invest political capital in 
universalizing a policy that had worked to decrease poverty in the past. In this regard, the 
legacies of a decidedly neoliberal approach to poverty alleviation in Brazil proved stronger than 
an alternative policy, even if the new party’s left-wing ideology could have envisioned a 
different approach to poverty eradication.  
 The universalization of Bolsa Família depended upon several decades prior to the advent 
of democracy that instituted rational action under the guidance of U.S. economics and political 
science and a constitutional reform that generated autonomous governments. Through the 
increased role of lawyers and educational centers, the technocratic context provided a large 
influence over the democratization movement as well as prepared intellectuals to become 
political figures innovating in social policy by advocating minimum income for the poorest 
sectors (Diagram 2). When municipalities in Brasilia and São Paulo reported success in CCT 
implementation, Cardoso gradually increased support for the policies, eventually making them 
the benchmark of his mandate; yet, his decisions attempted to remedy the Real Plan’s 
	   50	  
externalities on the poorest sectors. Later on, CCTs became unified under the Lula 
administration because the structural incentives of strong federalism produced governmental 
incentives for nation-wide cooperation. In other words, post-1988 constitutional reform and in 
the context of locally based experimentation from Cardoso’s era of hardening budget constraints, 
CCT became unified, from local projects to Bolsa Escola to Bolsa Família. 
 
Diagram 2. CCT Development within a Technocratic Field  
 
 CCTs in Brazil have been a major example of social policy heading in the direction of 
citizenship rights more than mere assistance-oriented programs. More than political will, 
however, the Brazilian example shows that configurations in political culture, fiscal constraints 
and institutional incentives drove innovation and expansion of anti-poverty policy strategies, 
only because the legal environment had constructed a bureaucratic field of rational action 
favorable to CCTs. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Emerging Misiones: Anti-Technocratic and Oil-Funded Policies in Venezuela 
 
Poverty is always politically defined. Defining poverty implies a normative 
conceptualization about the present social order, where the interpretations and consequences of 
poverty predetermine public policy and the emphasis that governments place on social programs  
(D’Elia, 2003; Grynspan, 2003 as cited in Maingon 2006, 62). As such, poverty policy in 
Venezuela has been strongly tied to the political realignments that started in the mid 1980s. 
Starting with the collapse of the traditional two party system, through the structural adjustment 
programs of Rafael Caldera up to the creation of Misiones by Hugo Chávez, this chapter traces 
the multiple transformations in poverty definitions and the historical contingencies responsible 
for the shifts. Venezuela’s example is most appropriate to underscore the political aspects of 
anti-poverty policies because it followed the path of neoliberal social policymaking until the rise 
of Hugo Chávez Frias in the late 1990s.  My discussion incorporates an analysis of the country’s 
institutional legacies, the effects of economic crises and the government’s loss of political 
legitimacy. It then moves on to an exploration of the factors behind the creation of CCTs in 1994 
and ends with a discussion of the political incentives behind the creation of the Misiones several 
years after Chavez’s election. Finally, the chapter offers a set of comparative remarks about 
policy development within Venezuela and a reflection on the tensions between ideologies, 
historical antecedents and democratic sustainability.  
 If Brazil’s story of social policy narrates the influence of neoliberal rationality in the 
creation of programs using cash transfers as behavioral incentives, Venezuela’s social policy 
history has been the opposite experience. Whereas U.S.-exported policy principles permeated 
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and consolidated in Brazil after the 1980s, large portions of the Venezuelan population were 
politically disillusioned, causing governmental institutions to reconfigure and shift away from 
neoliberal principles. Within the implosion of a party-dominated electoral system, the legacies of 
state consolidation that proved influential in Brazil lacked in Venezuela. Thus, the country faced 
multiple oil crises and subsequent political instability culminating in constitutional reform and in 
new ways of doing politics. As such, to understand social policy it is vital to analyze the 
country’s transformations through the lens of institutional legacies and political incentives. On 
the one hand, the study of the country’s institutional background, its structural weaknesses and 
broader economic contingencies prior to Hugo Chavez’s rise to power will reveal why CCTs 
became a viable option in 1994 but had no lasting impact decades later.  
 Studying contemporary Venezuelan politics will also underscore how competing interests 
for state power have motivated social programs and initiatives such as the Misiones.  Chávez’s 
first years in office showed indifference toward anti-poverty initiatives, whereas social policy 
innovation became the president’s signature after the government’s opposition represented a 
legitimate threat to holding power. Institutional legacies allowed Chavez to gain majority power 
in the 2004 constitutional assembly, and eventually reform the Constitution at his coalition’s will. 
Moreover, the emerging political polarization, combined with the newly adopted law on 
referenda, provided electoral incentives for the government to innovate in social policy.  
 The implosion of the party system and the rise to power of Hugo Chávez brought two 
consequences to contemporary Venezuelan politics, one ideological and the other institutional. 
On the one hand, the government’s rhetoric shifted away from austerity and neoliberal state 
management to a socialist and radical democratic nation-building project. On the other hand, the 
collapse of “partyarchy”—rule by dominant parties (Acción Democratica –AD—and Comité de 
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Organización Política y Electoral Independiente–COPEI--)—opened spaces in the political 
apparatus allowing Chávez to reform presidential powers and redraft Venezuela’s constitution.  
Larger institutional legacies, especially those modeled by Chavez’s predecessors like Carlos 
Andrés Pérez and Rafael Caldera conditioned these ideological and institutional transitions. In 
this context, this chapter documents how weak institutions contributed to the collapse of party 
politics and provided fertile territory for a massive reconfiguration of national governmental 
structures. Studying these transformations reveals that, in the search for broader constituencies, 
the Chávez regime identified social policy as a primary means to hold power and innovated in 
anti-poverty strategies.  
 
Political Legitimacy versus Economic Rationality 
The construction of the Venezuelan bureaucratic field, which rejected neoliberal policies 
and embraced alternative strategies such as the Misiones, had material roots in the economic 
environment and the political contention of the late twentieth century. The unambiguous national 
purpose to achieve modernity seen in Brazil lacked in Venezuela primarily due to the demise of 
the dominant development model and the debt crisis shaking the country after the 1980s 
(Contreras 2004, 112). In particular, the Mexican Peso Crisis forced the Luis Herrera Campins 
government (1979-1984) to devalue the currency and establish a controlled exchange system to 
restrict the massive outflow of private capital (Levine 2001). These economic measures made 
visible the fact that the dominant economic model systematically excluded citizens from material 
and symbolic benefits (Contreras 2004, 112). As such, poverty gained visibility and became a 
central issue in the national political agenda, given that the majority of the Venezuelan 
population felt the impact of the economic crisis close to home (Lander 1995, 75). This was the 
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initial stage of a series of events leading to a cognitive field in which constituencies and the 
emerging political actors rejected technocratic rule. 
Indeed, multiple factors combined at the end of the 1980s decade that precipitated a 
reconfiguration of power and made evident the need for a political and economic transformation; 
Contreras (2004) succinctly summarizes this context in six factors: (1) rising inflation: (2) 
macroeconomic instability: (3) generalized corruption: (4) declining wages and public services: 
(5) progressive internal and external indebtedness: and (6) weakening of the development model 
based on oil revenues (p. 113). By 1988, however, the Pérez administration had instituted 
austerity measures that followed the neoliberal discourse of the state’s disengagement in the 
national economy. In particular, economic policies focused on the reduction of imports and 
greater commercial openness to foreign markets and reduction of the fiscal deficit (Contreras 
2004:114). Overall, in the context of economic and political realignments and an emerging fiscal 
orthodoxy in the national government,xiii the state was viewed as only having promoted passivity 
amongst the poor and created a culture of dependency (Contreras 2004, 116). Nonetheless, the 
general inference from the 1980s, with such an unstable and austere environment, was that 
political legitimacy directly conflicted with the problems of economic rationality (Lander 1995, 
75). This oppositional perspective would mark subsequent demonstrations and emerging 
nationalist-populist political alternatives.   
Protests erupting simultaneously and extensively in several Venezuelan citiesin February 
1989, known as the Caracazo riots. These demonstrations helped to delegitimize the state and 
the dominant political parties in the eyes of most social sectors experiencing economic hardship. 
As such, they embodied the popular response to the tensions between a delegitimized 
government and its economic policy. Moreover, in this context of institutional fragility, political 
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disillusionment and social frustration, multiple sectors saw their rights threatened and began to 
demand a definition of democracy that would go beyond a representative model toward a more 
participatory framework (Contreras 2004,122). In other words, given that the field failed to 
symbolically legitimize the bureaucratic state through economic policy, a cognitive structure 
began to develop in which Venezuelan constituencies overwhelmingly chose actors who 
challenged neoliberal agendas.   
 In 1992, lieutenant colonel Hugo Chávez led a failed coup that put more pressure on 
Venezuelan representative democracy as well as the legitimacy of the structural adjustment 
programs (Contreras 2004, 122). Later that year (November 27, 1992), a second failed coup 
contributed to Pérez’s subsequent ouster in the face of corruption charges, event from which 
Rafael Caldera emerged as a third “alternative” to the political and economic crisis. Accordingly, 
the 1980s not only demonstrated a deep disillusionment with the development model by the 
popular sectors, but it led to the implosion of the two-party system.  At this moment, specifically 
Rafael Caldera’s rise to power on a platform of heterodox policies provides a critical period for 
the discussion of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) in Venezuela. Furthermore, it demonstrates 
the resilience of the bureaucratic field, in which the creation of anti-technocratic cognitive 
structures at the national level led to the rejection and sustainability of CCTs. 
 
Preliminary Attempts of CCT Implementation 
 After the social protests of 1989, the coup attempts of 1992, and corruption charges 
against Perez in 1993, Rafael Caldera presented himself as an actor capable of building 
consensus and transforming national crisis into order. With an empathetic attitude toward the 
sector that had sought change through extra-institutional means, like then-Colonel Chávez, 
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Caldera’s discourse framed itself in opposition to neoliberal economic schemes. Although 
Caldera campaigned under the banner of anti-neoliberal reform, he ultimately returned to 
austerity and IMF-style policies, which included CCTs. Rafael Caldera deviated from traditional 
party affiliations, while campaigning under anti-corruption rhetoric and statist economic policies. 
In particular, Caldera attempted to direct the economy through subsidies and price exchange 
controls (Trinkunas 2002:63-4).  
Anti-neoliberal actions did not last long. Contreras (2004) suggests that the 
organizational inertia deriving from the Perez regime had a national and international 
institutional support that was not going to decrease over time (p. 123). In fact, the financial crisis 
of the early 1990s forced the Caldera government to deploy a structural adjustment program 
called Agenda Venezuela, which deepened openness and allowed the influx of transnational 
capital into the oil industry (Coronil 2002:426). In short, within a year of being elected, Caldera 
would turn back to the policies he had questioned from his predecessor, pushing against the 
field’s anti-neoliberal sentiment. 
In Agenda Venezuela, signed in cooperation with the IMF in 1996, Caldera expressed the 
need to continue economic adjustment measures and state reforms that guaranteed conditions for 
a new economic model. Overall, the new development program prioritized macroeconomic 
objectives, such as reducing inflation, sustaining economic growth, and strengthening 
international reserves; and assigned the state the role to insert Venezuela in the world economy 
(López Maya 2000). Gómez and Alarcón (2003) explain that Caldera used this new legislation to 
build political consensus and construct a feeling of national stability. In particular, the anti-
poverty policies included in the Agenda model had a pacified the tensions between the crisis and 
the increasing social disparities previous governments had generated (Gómez 2003). Yet, the 
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new social policy determined ‘priority areas,’ such as school nutrition, public services, primary 
health care and economic solidarity. Similarly, policy strategies aimed to cut public spending, 
begin social security reform, privatize, and focalize on the poorest (Gomez 2003, 15). As such, 
the state was responding to international pressures and norms to develop a neoliberal kind of 
social policy, but the bureaucratic field had already been set up in opposition to these precepts.  
 The Caldera administration created several programs that distributed cash transfers to 
poor mothers, in both the cities and the rural areas and were linked to performance and children 
school attendance (Penfold-Becerra 2007:67). These programs emphasized the distribution of 
food via the school system at the state and municipal levels, in which the Ministry of the Family 
created under Caldera facilitated the logistics (Penfold-Becerra 2007:67). This was Venezuela’s 
first Conditional Cash Transfer, originating as one of Caldera’s operational tool to incorporate 
structural adjustment in response to a banking crash that had affected the country by 1994. In 
September 17, 1994, The Economist introduced Caldera’s new two-year plan, described by the 
finance minister as a “pragmatic dose of dogma-free, economic common sense.” In the same 
article, however, the newspaper acknowledged: “the heart of the new plan is an IMF-style attack 
on the budget deficit and inflation, better tax collection, and lower subsidies for public services 
(made more palatable by subsidies aimed specifically at the poor)” (The Economist 1994, my 
emphasis). The article exposed that the economic policies in Caldera’s administration motivated 
manipulation of social policy with the intent to better allocate resources, where using conditional 
transfers seemingly helped to legitimize this goal. CCTs in Venezuela, however, failed to 
symbolically legitimize these goals because the policies appeared within a politically 
disillusioned nation –the field. Yet, this field was a function of the country’s broader structural 
and institutional weaknesses. 
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Institutional Weaknesses against Neoliberalism 
 In The Magical State, Fernando Coronil (2002) argues that the Venezuelan political 
culture had been for decades involved in a discourse of plenty crafted by the very same 
politicians that benefited from continuously incoming oil revenues. As such, Coronil suggests 
that for most of the twentieth century, the telos of the Venezuelan government (interlocked 
within the two-party system) had been a gradual but sustained effort toward modernity. Having 
oil as a resource of ‘national wealth,’ Venezuelan constructions of government have juxtaposed 
citizens from transnational corporations, oil technocracies and capitalist empires. This 
phenomenon, describers Coronil through an anthropological perspective, occurs because the state 
has used oil revenues as its main financial basis. This implies that operational funds are extracted 
from international markets as cash as opposed to emanating from taxes on citizens’ productive 
activities (Maya Website). Similarly, overwhelming dependence on income from oil exports is 
said to have “froze” early political institutions and focused political parties, labor, capital, civil 
society, and the armed forces exclusively on gaining access to the state’s burgeoning wealth 
(Trinkunas 2002:43). As such, the oil crisis in the 1980s and 1990s reduced the state’s funding 
and its ability to satisfy competing political interests (Trinkunas 2002:43) eventually leading to 
the deterioration of the party-archal regime. This structural location within the global economy 
produced cognitive structures of popular discontent. Specifically, the traditional rentier state 
produced institutional weaknesses that conditioned the subsequent development of Venezuelan 
politics, making neoliberal anti-poverty policies like CCTs unviable following Chavez’s regime. 
 The strength of these cognitive structures is evident in the disillusionment with party 
politics exposed by changing voter preferences that made Chavez’s political campaign successful 
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in 1998. Trinkunas (2002) explains, “after capturing over 90 percent of the votes only a decade 
earlier, the dominant traditional parties, COPEI and AD, polled in the single digits in this 
presidential election” (p. 64). The reason, he argues, is that Chávez promised radical change, 
aiming to convene a constitutional assembly and rewrite the Constitution of 1961. In general, in 
the context of a seemingly fragmented social and political imaginary, Chávez was able to capture 
the impending anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist feelings of the subordinate classes with his 
popular-democratic discourse, thereby winning the 1998 elections (Contreras 2004:125). With 
the new president, Venezuela began a period of institutional transformations starting at the 
Constituent Assembly and unfolding debates concerning democracy and technocratic rule. In 
sum, political legitimacy versus economic rationality structured policy alternatives that stepped 
over CCTs. 
 In 1998, voters elected Chávez with more than 56 percent of the votes. A year later, the 
president had won enough popular support for the referendum (81 percent of the votes) and 
elected a new constituent assembly. In this new body, new rules allowed Chavez to win 96 
percent of the seats despite capturing only 53 percent of the votes. Clearly, his government 
enjoyed unprecedented majority and thus larger freedom to carry out legal reform. Venezuela 
approved the new Constitution in 2000 and voters elected a new legislature, giving Chávez a 
majority of the seats in the National Assembly. Thus, continuous victories allowed Chávez to 
concentrate strong legislative and non-legislative powers in the presidency and keep a close 
grasp on the National Assembly (Penfold-Becerra 2007:68).  Among the most optimistic viewers 
of this era, Contreras (2004:126) states that Chavez’s work in reconfiguring institutions “has 
meant a social and political learning process and a revaluing of the very notion of citizenship 
rights.” However, the most progressive initiatives in social policy and the expansion of social 
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provision in Venezuela do not necessarily correspond to the inherent value of Chavez’s rise to 
power. On the contrary, political motivators beginning in 2004 precipitated the emergence of 
Misiones and not the regime’s ideological stances. 
 The reconfiguration of power after Chavez’s ascendance to explains policy innovation. In 
fact, the newly drafted constitution under Chavez’s coalition created a stipulation that influenced 
much of the government’s future innovation in social policy: the power to call for popular 
referenda on issues including approval and elimination of laws and approval of constitutional 
reforms, and the power to unilaterally convoke another constituent assembly without checks on 
the process (Penfold-Becerra 2009, 69-70). Accordingly, as the political majority reformed the 
constitution and instituted referenda as a direct avenue for reform, electoral politics became a 
decisive mechanism to challenge Chávez’s government, or remain in power. 
 With the new legislature in place, political incentives clearly demarcated a contested way 
to bring about reform and challenge the government. During early 2001, the opposition forces 
mobilized significant sectors of the population against Chávez and gained the support of business 
associations and labor unions, demanding changes in key economic and social legislation. 
Specifically, these groups reproached statutes that Chávez had passed under an enabling law 
approved by the National Assembly in 2000 (Penfold-Becerra 2009:70). A general strike of 
FEDECAMARAS (Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce) in April 2002 was one 
examples of the way the opposition responded against Chávez’s new law (Penfold-Becerra 2009: 
71). However, the coup d’état that removed Chávez from office for three days that same month 
demonstrated the discontent with- and vulnerability of- the regime. Moreover, in December of 
the same year, another strike included top managers of the Venezuelan state-owned petroleum 
company (PSDV) (Penfold-Becerra 2009: 73). These manifestations, although unsuccessful 
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given Chávez’s military support, demonstrated the degree of discontent and the opposition’s 
commitment to bring down the regime. 
 Given the extreme environment of hostility toward Chávez and the short and ultimately 
failed coup, the opposition moved to the formal political channels in place. Penfold-Becerra 
writes:  
After the strike, the opposition finally accepted the suggestion made by the 
international community to start gathering signatures to activate a recall 
referendum, as permitted under the 1999 Constitution. To revoke the presidential 
mandate, the opposition had to win the referendum and obtain the same number of 
votes plus one (3,747,774) as the president had received in his previous election. 
(2007, 73) 
In relation to social policy, Penfold-Becerra argues that the Misiones social program emerged as 
a resource to gather popular support in the fear that the referendum could bring Chávez down 
from power. In particular, that the slow nature of the process, due to the legal and administrative 
obstacles created by the National Electoral Council (CNE)xiv, and the prevalence of officials 
loyal to the government and appointed by the Supreme Court, Chávez had enough time to use 
social policy as a form of clientelism and gain the opposition-led referendum. 
Penfold-Becerra writes from a Business Administration Institute (Instituto de Estudios 
Superiores en Administración), a technocratic perspective that has historically advocated for 
free-market policy frameworks and strongly opposed the Chávez government. This background 
is evident in the argument that the lack of institutional constraints and the electoral pressures to 
overcome the 2004 recall referendum probably gave the government incentives to manipulate 
politically the allocation of resources for the Misiones (Penfold-Becerra 2007, 68). While 
possibly true, this study’s focus on not in the clientelistic nature of social policy in South 
America but in the emergence and manufacturing of these policies and their relative importance 
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within larger legal development projects. As such, Penfold-Becerra’s critical insight is his 
description of institutional and political incentives leading the Chávez’s government to reform 
social policy: 
 By the time the opposition could overcome all the obstacles created by the CNE 
and formally activate the recall referendum, most of the Misiones were 
consolidated. (…) Chavez’s ability to link the social benefits of the programs with 
his need to assure the political mobilization of his popular base through the 
Misión Identidad (Identity Mission) became the cornerstone of his political 
strategy. Although a large portion of the population supported the opposition, 
Chávez was able to target low-income voters by using the Misiones to redistribute 
resources and regain political allegiance (Penfold-Becerra 2007, 75).   
To what extent “a large portion of the population” would have made a difference had the 
missions not been in place prior to the referendum is inconclusive and beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, the main point remains: the contested nature of institutions in Venezuela has 
given rise to social policy innovation. Within a cognitive framework, the decidedly anti-
neoliberal field overrode Caldera’s economic restructuring plans, those that involved public 
service cuts and originally incentivized him to implement CCTs. Instead, Chávez’s ideological 
basis of Misiones aligned better with the field, or national sentiment. Yet, it was the competition 
environment over state power –electoral incentives—what triggered the deployment of Misiones.    
 
Changes in Social Policy Institutions 
 The Chávez administration dismantled the Ministry for the Family that had been in 
charge of managing social funds under the Caldera presidency. Social programs designed under 
Caldera were re-dimensioned or eliminated, particularly those managed by NGOs or regional 
and local governments (Penfold-Becerra 2007:70), showing the weakness of these institutions 
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and the restructuring power that Chávez had gained. This maneuver was a critical transition 
away from neoliberal institutions and the basis for the future structural modification of social 
policy. Yet, the nature of the Misiones programs, as a categorical alternative to Conditional Cash 
Transfer programs, gained shape and identity through two main mechanisms: a contested field 
and an ideological symbol. First, political incentives—i.e. given the centralized power that the 
Chávez government had construed since 1998, the Misiones represented a political utility 
associated with expanding the electoral constituencies needed to remain in office and win the 
2004 referendum. Second, radical-socialist ideology operated as the symbol to legitimize such 
bureaucratic decisions.    
 The emergence of the Misiones matched an ideological turn in the Chávez administration. 
Specifically, the expansion of social services and wealth redistribution associated with Misiones 
is said to have been the first step in the construction of the Bolivarian Revolution. The explicit 
socialist turn in Chávez’s rhetoric occurred in 2004-5 (Gott 2005) and strengthened with his 
reelection in 2006. In particular, this political realignment brought about more radical policy 
initiatives, like the expanded role for the State, the re-nationalizing of key industries like 
telecommunications and electricity, and the promotion of a participatory and protagonistic 
democracy in public governance and in the workplace (Griffiths 2010:611 my emphasis). As 
such, although political incentives may explain the timing of social policy innovation, they do 
not necessarily explain the type of programs that are implemented. The institutional 
consolidation of US-imported rationality (i.e. the dominant cognitive perspective or doxa—
Bourdieu 1994) explained both the timing (1996) and the conditional emphasis in Brazilian 
CCTs (i.e. centralized in registration while decentralized in resource administration). Similarly, 
the way the institutional background structured the bureaucratic field to be anti-technocratic, and 
	   64	  
necessarily the way it defines poverty, explains why Misiones in Venezuela follow a citizenship 
rights to poverty eradication strategies rather than as an individual’s circumstance needed to be 
fixed through conditionalities (Diagram 3). 
 
Diagram 3. CCT Absence within an Anti-Technocratic Field 
   
 The Misiones program has been funded by heightened oil prices and an increase in state 
control over oil production, refining and other subsidiary industries. In 2005, the government 
introduced a change in the Central Bank of Venezuela Law, which authorized the partial use of 
the country’s international reserves to finance the new social programs, by creating two funds: 
FONDEN (Fondo de Desarrollo Nacional) and FONDESPA (Fondo para el Desarrollo 
Económico y Social). The government strategically reformed this law to access the exceeding oil 
revenues (when the price of petroleum were higher than the estimated by the national budget 
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each year), which it would later deposit in FONDEN to finance development plans (basic 
industry, infrastructure, transportation and housing) and another portion to the FONDESPA 
which is controlled by PDVSA (Chacín 2009:96). 
Misiones began by bringing Cuban employees to Venezuela to carry out projects 
similar to those massive literacy campaigns that took place soon after the Cuban 
Revolution in 1959. In addition, the country’s political polarization has led to the 
creation of ad hoc or institutionally parallels channels for the deployment of 
Misiones (Maingon 2006).  
These moves have been condemned because they are based on the president’s close ties with 
leaders and groups in charge and may inspire loyalty to the presidential movement and its leaders 
rather than the state. As such, Misiones would not be a policy allowing the exercise of citizenship 
rights but an extra-institutional mechanism for political alliances and clientelism. Similarly, 
Misiones operate under a suitable cognitive field of national animosity against technocracy, but 
the lack of financial constraints, and the overspending that comes attached with the absence of a 
technocratic bureaucracy, undermine the programs sustainability.   
 According to D’Elia and Cabezas (2008) this ideological foundation of the Misiones is 
vulnerable to the system by putting its sustainability at risk. They argue that if services and 
programs are not institutionalized, specifically under state management, their social legitimacy 
will be lost and their structure and development will weaken: “[i]f services network does not 
function according to a model of public management overseeing personnel that follow working 
rules over local and national authority, the services’ users will not be able to claim rights or 
obligations to benefits, neither will providers feel obliged to comply”(15). Similarly, that if the 
Misiones continue to be separate form other programs that already enjoy infrastructure, 
personnel and proved methods, it is likely that the programs will weaken and because of failing 
to satisfy their own needs. 
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 As presented early in this chapter, popular disillusionment with oil technocracies and 
governmental elites has shaped major transformation in Venezuelan politics in recent years. Yet, 
structural considerations shaping the efficacy and vices of governmental incumbents remain 
latent and continue to shape a lot of the behavior described in Coronil’s Magical State.  On the 
one hand, the model of democracy of the 1970s (Pacto Punto Fijo) collapsed because it was 
incapable of making the country more productive and inclusive; it also failed at making the 
necessary investments to provide a welfare system that aligned with the country’s material 
wealth (Maingon 2006). Furthermore, the two-party system also linked oil revenues to short-term 
development plans simultaneously failing at democratizing society and building a stable and 
responsible state (Maignon 2006). On the other hand, however, a similar struggle continued to 
happen with Misiones and the Chavista government. In the words of Margarita Lopez Maya1  
 While progressives of the world admire the state’s capacity to invent almost 
every week new participatory policies and/or new ways of making oil revenues 
flow toward popular sectors, where is the non-rentier economic model, incentives 
to the autonomy of the consejos communales (local councils) and unions, forms of 
pacific coexistence [or] regulatory institutions who could invoke the magical 
state? Like the shadow that the Swiss psychologist Jung spoke of, the magical 
state seems to have occupied once again the nation’s body, thanks to elites that 
stubbornly deny sharing a resemblance or relation to the past. [The magical state] 
lives a new debut. (Maya 2007). 
In other words, the bureaucratic field that places political legitimacy against technocracy 
and economic rationality has been a function of the tension between responsible and 
accountable government and the country’s institutional foundations on oil revenues 
(whether neoliberal, like in the 1980s or socialist, present since the early 2000s). 
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Comparative Considerations for an Alternative Model  
 The political environment in Venezuela in the 1980s and 1990s offers two comparative 
cases within a single country that expose how historical contingencies affect the formulation of 
poverty policy. Venezuela experienced the emergence of CCTs at the same time that these 
policies started to take off in Brazil and Mexico, and began to be considered in Colombia. This 
shall come as no surprise given the ubiquitous presence of World Bank and IMF-rationality and 
structural adjustment programs across Latin America, and their particular proximity with 
Caldera’s government. Yet, several economic pressures accompanied this process: on the one 
hand, the 1994 economic crisis certainly triggered Caldera’s acceptance of adjustment programs, 
including conditional transfers; on the other hand, larger instability and Chávez’s uprising 
blocked the subsequent development of these policies. Only five years after Chavez’s election in 
1999 did the Misiones appear, and represented a last minute effort to consolidate a supportive 
electoral constituency. 
 Returning to this chapter’s opening statement, poverty is a politically defined and the 
fluctuations in ideological commitments in Venezuela’s government demonstrate the shifts in the 
way programs address this social phenomenon. Whereas conditional transfers fight poverty by 
tackling the protection of human capital and provide financial support for a minimum standard of 
living, they also avoid addressing the deeper causes of poverty such as income redistribution or 
the spatial dimensions that perpetuate poverty.xv In contrast, Misiones frames the development of 
poor sectors as a holistic process that must be radically redistributive and uses no conditionalities 
in the provision of funds while targeting communities as wholes.  
 My discussion suggests that fiscal constraints have affected the creation of poverty 
policies, initially under president Rafael Caldera in 1994 and ten years later under Hugo Chávez. 
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Although important, these fiscal constraints explain the non-conditional characteristic, but do so 
only in the context of a broader cognitive environment and a bureaucratic field rejecting 
technocratic rule and embraced symbolic socialism. Indeed, the symbolic nature of Chávez’s 
socialism becomes evident when considering his social policies to be a translocation of the same 
operative state that structures its institutions and activities solely on oil-funds and revenues. 
Whereas economic pressures under Caldera pointed incumbents to rely on the Washington 
Consensus, economic boom in the early 2000s permitted Chavez to fund Misiones through non-
institutional means. That is, using the exceeding revenues from oil sales, the Chavez government 
consolidated two important social policy funds and created new institutional structuresxvi to 
implement redistributive policies.  The history of Venezuelan politics and institutions presented 
in this essay show the ways the government reproduced CCTs or innovated with Misiones.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Developing Familias en Acción: Militarism and Neopopulism in Colombia 
 
 Familias en Acción is the Colombian conditional cash transfer that followed the example 
of the Brazilian Bolsa Escola program in the late 1990s. However, Familias en Acción is a 
subprogram, meaning that it is only a component of a larger plan seeking to reverse the effects of 
poverty on the very poor. As such, although FA seeks to incentivize the formation of human 
capital through conditioned monetary incentives, like the Brazilian Bolsa Família, this program 
has an assistance-only nature and origin (See appendix A for comparison). This chapter explains 
the program’s technical characteristics and outlines its goal of providing temporary relief. By 
addressing the Colombian political history in the 1990s the chapter later accounts for the 
program’s secondary role in anti-poverty social policy. In particular, the President played a 
central role the program’s original design and implementation and proposed the funding be 
drawn from foreign banking institutions that supporting focalized policies. As Colombia moved 
away from traditional bi-partisan politics, these structural characteristics allowed the new regime 
to appropriate the conditional transfer as a tool to broaden electoral constituencies. Thus, the 
appearance of a CCT in Colombia emerged from the intersection of pacification and state 
strengthening strategies, in which the executive copied popular regional models to combat the 
recession’s effect on poverty levels but later used it as an electoral tool. As such, the last section 
will offer an assessment of the political incentives that have shaped the transformation of 
Familias en Acción, from a temporary subprogram to national public policy that continues to 
expand. 
 To make sociological sense of Familias in Acción and understand its political 
implications, the project must be placed in historical perspective. Specifically, why did the 
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recession in the late 1990s result in a CCT subprogram and not a larger initiative? What can 
Colombia’s history tell us about the tendencies in social policymaking and the use of institutional 
avenues to fight poverty, and how they shape use and reach of CCTs? Similarly, what roles have 
larger international organizations and the United States played in the formulation of these 
policies? And how does foreign funding condition the capabilities, design and philosophy of 
anti-poverty policy?  Using the Colombian example, this chapter unravels the complexities 
within CCTs: when imported as a concept from a different state but mixed with the host 
country’s structural capabilities and political contingencies, CCT programs only develop as 
assistance-oriented and may not become substantively influential in national social policy. 
Furthermore, just like previous inferences from Brazilian and Venezuelan CCTs, they may 
become a tool for modern forms of clientelism and populist rhetoric. Thus, like in previous 
chapters, the historical trajectory of national political strategies and the institutional incentives 
that trigger them reveal the construction of bureaucratic fields. These fields have had different 
impacts across cases, but in the Colombian case it has generated a cognitive understanding of 
social policy along the lines of security and militaristic nation-building projects. 
 
Governability Crises and Economic Recession  
 Colombia’s 1991 national constitution set the structural foundations for social policy 
initiatives in the 1990s. During the drafting process, the Constituent National Assembly and 
President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo stood in opposition to each other. The former represented a large 
plurality of interests, such as those of demobilized guerilla groups, trade unions, indigenous 
groups and new social and religious movements, and generally sought parallel political, 
economic and social reform. In contrast, Gaviria sought to prioritize economic reform, which 
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encouraged a developmental model focusing on economic growth through market liberalization 
that aimed to provide stability. After achieving macroeconomic stability, Gaviria argued, the 
state could focus on more substantive debates over social policy. From the 1991 Constitution 
emerged structural reforms at the macro level, including the creation of a fully independent 
Central Bank and decentralization of most government spending. These broad-based package 
reforms aimed at enhancing competition, allowing the operation of foreign banks in the country, 
increasing reliance on market instruments, and reducing government and monetary authorities’ 
intervention in the financial system  (Echavarría 2005). Such prepared the institutional bridges 
for future involvement by the World Bank, International Development Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund toward the end of the decade. 
 Constitutional debates also occurred at a time of internal armed conflict, which combined 
with the late 1990s economic recession to intensify existing governability challenges. In 
particular, the presence of guerilla groups and illegal self-defense organizations—Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), 
whose sources of revenue derived largely from drug trafficking and coca-leaf and marijuana 
farming—swayed the dispute toward an emphasis on security and peace-building rather than 
comprehensive social reform. In fact, the Ernesto Samper government (1994-1998) further 
complicated the adversarial context, as the president had been accused of having received funds 
from drug trafficking groups for his presidential campaign in 1994.  These events had domestic 
repercussions, such as a decline in the government’s operational legitimacy (Ramirez 2002), as 
well as international consequences, particularly on Colombian-U.S. relations. For instance, 
reported The Economist in 1998: 
The United States for two years “decertified” Colombia as an anti-drugs ally, and 
still denies Mr. Samper a visa. By any norms, let alone those of diplomacy, this 
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was a weird attempt to destabilise a foreign government. And it worked. But it 
also did not work, maintains a resentful Mr. Samper: “This attitude of 
confrontation, the international ‘satanisation’ of my government and of the 
president personally, undoubtedly weakened us in the war on drugs.” (The 
Economist 1998) 
This deterioration in U.S-Colombia foreign relations served as the background for a newly and 
invigorated anti-drug trafficking campaign by Samper’s opposition party. In fact, the new 
president –Andrés Pastrana Arango, from the rival conservative party—concentrated his 
government in reestablishing and strengthening diplomatic ties with U.S. President Bill Clinton. 
Accordingly, by shaping Colombian domestic policies targeted to fight guerilla warfare and 
support state repression, the U.S. contributed to the consolidation of a bureaucratic field centered 
on issues of national security. 
 The origins of this field’s militaristic orientation, like in the Brazilian and Venezuelan 
cases, originated from the economic context in which norms of policymaking become 
institutionalized. Pastrana inherited an economy at 3-4 percent growth, rising unemployment, a 
governability crisis and deteriorating foreign relations with the U.S. The peso was volatile, 
reported The Economist, and interest rates had to be jacked up to support it, meaning that 
pacification strategies had no financial backing [1998]. Accordingly, Pastrana ran on a campaign 
promising to end the war by means of dialogue.  This promise implied his commitment to 
strengthen state power in remote areas and improving diplomatic ties. During his first year in 
office, Pastrana constantly traveled to the White House, eventually persuading Clinton to commit 
resources to the “war on drugs” by October 1998. The United States increased its military 
assistance up to 289 million dollars in 1999, which turning Colombia into the third largest 
receptor of U.S.-aid after Israel and Egypt (Tickner 2000). 
 Not surprisingly, U.S. aid came attached to political compromise. In August 1999, 
Thomas Pickering—third in power at the State Department of the time—visited Colombia and 
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warned Pastrana not to seem too lenient with the FARC, or else he could lose U.S. financial 
support (Tickner 2000). Conversely, Pickering declared that the Clinton administration would 
support Colombia with new aid if the government designed a comprehensive plan focused on the 
war on drugs (LeoGrande 2000)— eventually known as “Plan Colombia.” By June 2000, the 
United States agreed to lend Colombia 1.2 billion dollars between 2000 and 2001, from which 25 
percent of the aid corresponded to assistance targeting human rights issues, judicial reform and 
law enforcement, aid to displaced communities and pacification processes. The other 75 percent 
was designed to strengthen the military ($512 million) and the police ($123 million) so as to 
recover state power over the country’s southern areas and eradicate drug crops. These data 
illustrate the proportions by which the government invested and distributed its newly acquired 
funds. Overall, the Plan Colombia had an explicit objective to fight drug trafficking, but under 
the rhetoric of a “plan for peace, prosperity and the strengthening of the state” that also 
incorporated several other development programs. These complementary initiatives addressed 
economic recovery, reform to the judicial system, democratization and human rights and social 
development (Presidency of the Republic 1999, 9). In fact, social policies became 
complementary efforts in the pursuit of stability and pacification of remote areas. The way the 
presidency crafted new institutions to fund programs like Familias en Acción reveals the national 
government’s emphasis on state consolidation over comprehensive social policy reform. 
 The Social Solidarity Net is Familias en Acción hosting institution, which emerged from 
Plan Colombia and operated through the Fund for Peace Investments (FIP). First proposed in 
1998 (Law 487, and incorporated by decree in 2000), the FIP is a fund account of the 
Administrative Department of the Presidency (DAPRE) that seeks to finance programs and 
projects contributing to peace consolidation.  The FIP is also administered and directed by 
	   74	  
officials with no labor ties to the presidency and in cooperation with the National Planning 
Department (DNP). Yet, the Social Solidarity Net operates independently from other strategies 
within the FIP and by a national coordinator and a professional group takes charge of the three 
subprograms. As such, the Social Safety Net started operating in 2001 with a total estimated 
investment of $768 million for an initial period of three years (Nuñez 2006). 
2006). These bureaucratic ties suggest that Colombia’s CCT emerged within a field in which the 
government hold solid bias on the goals of security and pacification and used anti-poverty policy 
as tools. 
 The Social Solidarity Network’s original design also revealed inadequate and rushed 
governmental planning.  Official records labeled the SSN as an emergency intervention for 
extremely poor populations and whose programs were designed to be flexible so that they could 
be shrunk after the recession. Indeed, Roberto Perotti (in Echavarria 2005) states that: 
[The Social Solidarity Net (SSN)] exemplifies a“fire-fighting” approach to social 
policy-making. Two of the three programs it contains (conditional grants to 
families and youth training programs) would make perfect sense as components 
of a well-thought permanent safety net. However, the package is designed not to 
build a permanent social safety but rather to cope with (hopefully) temporary 
recession. Partly because of this, and partly because they have been arranged 
hastily, these plans represent little more than Keynesian money thrown in a 
recessionary economy.     
Moreover, unavoidable funding and delay in money transfers made the SSN a permanent 
protection network only for the few (Nuñez 2006). Familias en Acción has been implemented in 
the municipalities with less than 100.000 inhabitants, where there is appropriate supply of 
services in education, health, and which have a banking institutions for the payment of subsidies 
to the beneficiaries. In June 2002, 332.420 families in poverty had benefited from Familias en 
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Acción and in December of 2004 the program had reached more than 514.502 families (Nuñez 
2006). After impact evaluations determined that school attendance rates and child medical care 
visits had indeed increased, child labor decreased and the consumption and frequency of animal 
protein and vegetables gone up, the program expanded in 2006. 
 In sum, Familias en Acción in Colombia emerged out of the intersection between: (1) a 
militaristic political culture evident in the creation of Plan Colombia and the subsequent 
development of securitization programs, and (2) the impact of an economic recession 
exacerbating extreme poverty. These two periods constructed a bureaucratic field conditioning 
the marginal role of conditional transfers. On the one hand, discursive trends in social policy in 
the region, such as Brazilian and Mexican CCTs, presented a feasible and seemingly successful 
opportunity to respond to the recession. However, as opposed to Bolsa Família and Progresa-
Oportunidades, Familias en Acción was not seen from the outset as part of concurrent long-term 
strategies to form human capital and overcome extreme poverty (Alviar Garcia 2011). On the 
contrary, the Colombian state embraced CCTs—conceptualized as a new norm of social 
policy—to the extent that it embraced the security-biased bureaucratic field. For example, the 
strengthening of U.S.-Colombian relationships through Pastrana’s diplomacy and Plan Colombia 
increased the viability of financial support originating from the World Bank, the IMF, and the 
IDB. Accordingly, the fact that Familias en Acción originated from an executive mandate from 
the Presidency and relied on funding from foreign banking institutions shaped its role as a 
focalized and temporary social assistance tool. Just like in Venezuela, this structural background 
would precisely generate upcoming incentives for the new President to continue the program 
beyond the four years for which it was originally envisioned.  
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The Dominance of “Democratic Security”  
 Expansion in antipoverty policies occurs when institutional incentives align with the 
dominant views of the state’s bureaucratic field (doxa, see Bourdieu 1994). In the Colombian 
case, electoral incentives triggered an expansion of Familias en Acción only inasmuch as the 
policy remained coherent with securitization priorities. For the first time in Colombian history, 
the republic’s president did not emerge from one of the two traditional political parties (Partido 
Conservador and the Partido Liberal). Uribe ran as an independent in 2002 and in 2005 formed 
the Partido de la U for his re-election campaign. Semana magazine explains that the party’s 
name evidently represents a tribute to the president’s last name, which ruled a third of the 
country’s congress since 2002 and gathered several renowned politicians around an ideological 
project while taking advantage of the president’s popularity (7/31/2010). As in Venezuela, the 
president enjoyed majority power in congress and a broad popularity amongst the electoral 
constituencies.  
 In 2002, 53.2 percent of voters elected Álvaro Uribe, hoping his iron fist approach to the 
country’s conflict would achieve more than Pastrana’s prior peace talks with the FARC. Galindo 
Hernandez (2007:151) notes that Uribe’s electoral campaign advocated security as its central 
governability pillar and emphasized “internal enemies,” thereby strengthening the state’s 
authoritarianism under the logic of recovering sovereignty. Uribe named the approach 
“Democratic Security,” founded upon improving the efficacy of anti-guerilla strategies and 
reestablishing the authority principle through institutional reform. In fact, such was Uribe’s 
popularity (60-70 percent approval) through programs like Democratic Security, that he was 
reelected in 2006 with 62.2 percent of the votes. In his new mandate Uribe made Democratic 
Security a central component of the National Development Program (NDP): “toward a 
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community-based state.”  This title invoked the goal to create “a participatory state that involved 
citizens in the attainment of social goals. A management state that invests with efficiency and 
austerity public resources. A state that privileged regional autonomy with transparency, political 
responsibility and community participation” (Republic’s Presidency 2002,15).  Galindo (2007, 
153) explains this “new” democratic security as an adaptation of the old national security 
schemes, with which the president sought to place his authoritative project that prioritized 
national defense within the context of a participatory democracy. 
 Familias en Acción transitioned from governmental program to public policy in the Uribe 
government, and received a central role in 2006 within the government’s National Development 
Programs. In the first NDP (2002-2006), Uribe advocated for a conservative spending program 
which prioritized sustained economic growth, employment generation and securitization 
strategies over social policy. Yet, the plan promised to assess the effectiveness of the SSN’s 
programs in order to identify which of them ought to be maintained. In fact, the annual resources 
given to Familias en Acción as a proportion of social spending in Colombia increased 5.9 percent 
in 2001-03 (Andes Paper). Thus, the temporary program seeking to compensate for the economic 
crisis in the late 1990s began an expansionary trajectory and remained an active policy based on 
continuously satisfactory impact assessments (Departmanto Nacional de Planeación 2010). The 
second NDP clearly articulated a development rhetoric placing comprehensive social security 
reform as secondary:    
Achieving lower poverty and inequality levels depends fundamentally on the 
fulfillment of other goals, in areas such as growth, infrastructure, housing, and 
security and justice. In the social sphere, it is of most importance to fulfill 
employment generation goals and improving its quality, and education reach, 
given that these sectors have a major influence over income.  
Nonetheless, Familias en Acción remained an active program. This contradiction reveals 
a major connection between Uribe’s political development in the country and the 
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continuation of the conditional transfer program. Most importantly, similarly to the 
Venezuelan emergence of Misiones, institutional incentives of an electoral nature seem to 
have driven the continuation and consolidation of Familias en Acción.  
 
Electoral Incentives and Campaigning over Social Policy  
 
 Uribe strengthened Familias en Acción by including 920,000 beneficiary additional 
families from 848 municipalities in 2006. In doing so, the president shifted the program’s focus 
from mitigation and shock recovery to long-term social policy and justified it in terms of long-
term and permanent policy goals, such as preventing school absenteeism and improving the 
country’s “social fabric” (Alviar Garcia 2011). Quantitatively speaking, whereas the program 
had 200,000 beneficiary families in the beginning of Uribe’s mandate, toward the end there were 
approximately 2.9 million households receiving the subsidy from the government. However, 
Alviar Garcia notes that “Colombia’s use of Familias en Acción is a prime example of the short-
term use of conditional cash transfer programs without a plan for an interface with other social 
programs that affect opportunities and outcomes for the poor in the labor market.” Uribe only 
raised the minimum wage by 55 percent between 2003 and 2010—in comparison to Brazilian 
president Lula da Silva who raised it 330 percent—and actually eliminated many workers’ 
benefits in an attempt to increase demand for labor. As such, like Bolsa Família, Familias en 
Acción seems to have been a useful tool to obtain popular support rather than a long-term policy 
with concrete anti-poverty goals.  
 Nonetheless, like the Venezuelan Misiones, the Colombian CCT overrode the state’s 
infrastructural capacity by permitting the president to claim ownership of the program. From a 
localized program designed to compensate for the effects of structural adjustment programs, 
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Familias en Acción became a populist mechanism. Specifically, Uribe by indicating that the 
expansion in beneficiary families represented an achievement on behalf of the government in 
reducing the country’s poverty levels (Alviar Garcia 2011). In May of 2009, as reported by the 
presidential website, Uribe stated: 
‘Do you know how many families benefitted from the program in Colombia when 
this Government took office? 220 thousand, that is very little. It was a temporary 
and experimental program. Do you know how many families will have benefitted 
by July this year? Three million, three million. [Furthermore], Bogotá did not 
have Familias en Acción, it had zero families under the program. Do you know 
how many families in Bogotá will benefit from the program in June? 150 
thousand families.  
 
This cynical use of CCTs for political campaigning, Alviar Garcia argues, results largely because 
Familias en Acción, is not governed by law but by documents that are drafted and executed an 
independent institution called CONPES (National Economic and Social Policy Council). This 
organism is not subject to judicial review, which seems to have allowed the program to “become 
the bargaining chip of an authoritarian president” (Alviar Garcia 2011). Similar to the electoral 
incentives of referenda in Venezuela and the Brazilian structural incentives embedded in 
federalism, Colombia’s CCT expansion occurred because of competition within the bureaucratic 
field.  
 The categorical difference, however, is that electoral incentives generate non-
infrastructural avenues for policy expansion. Like the Venezuelan oil funds, Colombia’s CCT 
relied on the CONPES, an organization serving political interests rather than the state’s 
technocratic administration. CONPES is the maximum organism of cooperation for economic 
policy in Colombia. Technically, the organism does not dictate decrees but provides orientation 
for macroeconomic policy and is headed by the president and the major official of the National 
Planning Department. Additionally, several ministries also belong to the organism as well as the 
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CEO of the national bank. CONPES has drafted three main documents for the creation, 
development and expansion of Familias en Acción.xvii In particular, the second loan permitted the 
program’s expansion to Bogotá, the capital city, allowing Uribe to provide evidence of his 
government’s achievements during the 2006 campaign. As such, the fact that the President 
headed the organism in charge of drafting the proposals and obtaining foreign funds, the 
convenient timing preceding the reelection campaign and the President’s explicit proselytizing 
demonstrate the electoral rationale behind transforming Familias en Acción, from a temporary 
subprogram into a national policy. In 2009 there was a final loan request to the IDB, but with the 
projection of making FA eventually fully funded by the national budget.  As of 2010, about half 
of the program was funded through the national budget, half of it through loans (Departamento 
de Planeación Nacional 2010). Nonetheless, despite changes in funding, there is an important 
unmodified characteristic of Familias en Acción: the president remains the operative and 
executive head of the program. 
 The central government is in charge of Familias en Acción through two institutions over 
which the President possesses main discretionary power:  the Presidential Agency for Social 
Action and International Cooperation (PASAIC) and the National Planning Department (DNP). 
The PASAIC resulted from merging the Social Solidarity Net (SSN) and the Colombian Agency 
for International Cooperation whose role was to channel international funding for social 
programs (Departamento de Planeación Nacional 2010). The role of PASAIC regarding Familias 
en Acción is the execution of the program through a National Coordinating Unit (UCN) and 
several Regional Coordinating Units (UCR), which interface with municipal authorities at a 
lower level, in order to implement the program (Alviar Garcia 2011). In addition, the DNP is in 
charge of preparing, following up, and evaluating the results of governmental policies and 
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programs, at the same time that it depends directly on the President. As for Familias en Acción, 
the DNP provides information for deciding the targeted municipalities and families, as well as 
designing the program because it provides technical support to the CONPES, in drafting and 
publishing the CONPES documents in which the program has been designed and subsequently 
enlarged  (Alviar Garcia 2011).  
 Based on satisfactory assessment indicators in 2006, the National Planning Department 
decided to incorporate Familias en Acción as a sustained effort against poverty in the 2006-2010 
National Development plan with a couple of modifications. First, Familias en Acción would then 
be targeted to all families experiencing violent displacement and in extreme poverty all over the 
country, as opposed to those within certain municipalities. Second, it also makes sure that the 
implementation of the program comes attached to the establishment of banking institutions—
thus, covering over a million and a half individuals. Finally, the program would become part of a 
larger strategy called RED JUNTOS, which seeks to provide resources for the benefiting families 
to become informed and access alternative opportunities such as microcredit and savings 
program (Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia 2009, 71). As such, the supplementary role of 
Familias en Acción has been to incorporate the lowest income families into the banking system 
with the advantage of charging no operative fees (Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia 2009, 
72). 
 
From Contingency to Policy Frameworks 
 Starting in 1996 when Colombia experienced a devastating economic recession, the 
presidential office decided to implement a temporary assistance program for the extremely poor. 
The project, however, was conceived within a national government’s cognitive structure that 
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prioritized securitization strategies like Plan Colombia and other state consolidation plans in the 
country’s remote areas. Moreover, the following president further solidified this militaristic 
national political culture by advocating a ‘Democratic Security’ approach to governability, which 
evidently prioritized state-building and economic growth over social policy reform. Accordingly, 
state officials envisioned Familias en Acción in a broader historical context that conceived 
security, and not poverty eradication, to be the fundamental prerequisite for national 
development, yielding no more than a temporary and assistance-oriented CCT. As such, a 
militaristic political culture structured the state’s understanding of poverty as the result of 
insecurity and a missing state (Diagram 4). 
 The intersection of a recessionary economy and a historically presidentialist structure led 
the Pastrana administration to draft the CCT policy in the late 1990s, but under no institutional 
oversight. In addition, banking institutions originally funded Familias en Acción in accordance to 
the overarching goals of increasing state’s governmental capacity. These financial considerations 
explained the temporary approach for the initial proposal but unleashed a series of institutional 
incentives that shaped the CCT’s subsequent development. When the Uribe government had 
begun to develop a proto-type of direct democracy, in which the popularity of the executive 
became attached to the president’s platform, Familias en Acción served as a clientelistic tool for 
political campaigning. As such, the CCT expanded and transformed, from temporary measure to 
national public policy, without a deeper interrogation of the program’s goals of poverty 
eradication. The program also lacked complementary efforts, such as restructuring of the labor 
market or broader social security reform. The transformation, instead, indicated that Uribe’s 
neopopulism had nurtured from targeted social policy to increase the official’s chance to remain 
in power for the following mandate. Unfortunately, these electoral incentives will continue to 
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exist until cash transfers gain institutional autonomy like they do under Bolsa Família in Brazil. 
To the extent that social policy is linked to the president’s popularity, used during campaigning, 
and operates under no oversight from regulatory agencies—like the Misiones in Venezuela—
Familias en Acción will remain a powerful clientelistic tool and an ineffective strategy for actual 
poverty eradication and holistic community/national development. 
 
Diagram 4. CCT Development within a Militaristic Field 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Policy Developments within Bureaucratic Fields 
 
 
Rationality in Comparative Perspective 
 Political practices that emerged for identifiable historical reasons take on meaning when 
ideological principles are articulated to support them (Dobbin 1994, 23). In this process of 
rationalization, existing state characteristics become socially constructed as constitutive of 
political order. In Bourdeusian terms, state formation legacies constructed national doxas, or the 
dominant cognitive structures that the state itself develops and continuously legitimizes 
policymaking. The aforementioned anti-poverty policy histories precisely reveal how each policy 
took on cultural meanings that aligned with each doxa (Table 2). Specifically, macro-economic 
stability platforms and Social Risk Management influenced the emergence and consolidation of 
Bolsa Família in Brazil, anti-technocratic and radical democratic models pre-empted the 
deployment of Misiones in Venezuela and pacification and securitization strategies shaped 
Familias en Acción in Colombia. In narrating these influences, this study has shown how 
institutions in each nation followed a discernible logic that permeated various state attributes: the 
locus of public authority (Field), the concentration of powers (Political Contention), the system 
of office-holding and public expertise (Expertise), and public fiscal capacities (Fiscal 
Constraints) (Dobbin 1994, 23). 
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Table 2. Socio-Legal and Cultural Framework of Early Policy Design 
 
 Brazil 
 
Venezuela Colombia 
Bureaucratic 
Field 
Technocratic Anti-Technocratic  Militaristic  
Political 
Contention  
Autonomous 
Governments 
 
Presidentialism and 
Congressional 
Majority 
Presidentialism and 
Congressional 
Majority 
Expertise Lawyers and National 
Technopols 
Foreign Banking 
Institutions 
Foreign Banking 
Institutions 
Early 
Policy 
CCT  
(Experimentation in 
Campinas and Brasilia, 
Bolsa Escola, etc) 
Non-CCT 
(Failed Caldera’s 
CCTs) 
CCT  
(Familias en Acción, 
phase one) 
 
 A strong U.S. presence in Brazilian academic and legal institutions conditioned a heavily 
technocratic political culture in the 1990s. Brazilian social scientists and technocrats advanced 
the notion that poverty could be eradicated through a direct cash nexus between the state and the 
individual and the policy soon began to be experimented in the context of macroeconomic 
stability in 1996. The idea later influenced other states, like Colombia’s decision to use such a 
policy tool to combat the exacerbation of poverty after an economic recession ending in 1998. In 
this case, the Colombian government emphasized militaristic projects and economic growth, 
only conceding the idea a limited role that yielded an assistance-oriented measure. Lastly, 
Venezuela’s political culture placed political legitimacy against economic rationality through 
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several decades of popular disillusionment with governmental elites and development models. 
This antagonism between technocratic rule and the electorate erased the bureaucratic 
infrastructure that Brazil and Colombia enjoyed at the time of CCT implementation. 
  Political cultures are indeed necessary to explain the context in which poverty is 
perceived as a problem and the extent to which it should be tackled through state policy. Poverty 
in Brazil became a major issue in national politics after the advent of democracy and the 
consolidation of multi-party politics. As such, poverty became a central issue in governmental 
platforms only after the mid 1990s when high inflation a public deficits had been controlled. In 
contrast, poverty was approached differently in Venezuela and Colombia because electoral 
institutional incentives triggered policy innovation or expansion. Yet, lacking structural and 
fiscal constraints, the two countries built non-institutional mechanisms to tackle the social issue.  
 Colombia’s presidency took the initiative to design a temporary program that fulfilled the 
national discourse of the time—strengthening state presence throughout the territory—and also 
drew from regional experiences—the relative success of Bolsa Família in Brazil and 
Oportunidades in Mexico. Thus, cultural meanings within bureaucratic fields provide a 
conceptual tool to understand the process by which constituents and incumbents rationalize their 
actions, even if those actions are ultimately triggered by institutional incentives over state power 
or constrained by fiscal and financial considerations (See table 3). In other words, expansion in 
anti-poverty policies occurs because of institutional incentives—structural or electoral—(timing) 
while the type of expansion is a function of the bureaucratic field. Structural incentives and high 
fiscal constraints produced CCTs in Brazil while the cultural meaning of rights as citizenship 
entitlements universalized those into Bolsa Família. Electoral incentives in Venezuela, in 
addition to low fiscal boundaries, triggered innovation in social policy through Misiones and 
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symbolically legitimized the field’s anti-technocratic sentiment. Colombian rhetoric of 
democratic security, on the other hand, combined with electoral incentives to bring about the 
expansion of Famlias en Acción but not its transformation into universal policy.  
 
 
Table 3.  Material and Ideological Sources of Policy Expansion 
 
 Brazil  Venezuela  Colombia  
Cultural 
Meaning 
Citizenship Rights Citizenship Rights  Democratic Security  
Institutional 
Incentives 
Structural Electoral Electoral 
Fiscal 
Constraints 
High Low High-Moderate 
Policy Universal CCT 
(Bolsa Família) 
Universal Non-CCT 
(Misiones) 
Assistance CCT  
(Familias en Acción, 
phase two) 	  
Focalized versus Universalized Policy 
 
 Most of the contemporary literature on Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America 
focuses on the programs’ methodological and technical considerations. In contrast, this study 
aimed to put three CCTs in conversation with states’ historical trajectories. Future work should 
use these inferences and place them in conversation with states’ definitions of poverty, public 
policy and citizenship (C. Ramirez 2008). Specifically, neoliberal ideology has clearly 
influenced social policy through focalization and conditionality, which are supposed to guarantee 
a more efficient administration of resources and inspire collaboration between public and private 
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actors with the larger goal of ensuring macroeconomic stability (C. Ramirez 2008). These 
influences belong to a broader phenomenon in which Latin American states have been 
increasingly changing their understandings of poverty and poverty alleviation. From a macro-
structural phenomenon that could be addressed through development policy goals and 
macroeconomic policy instruments, poverty has become a localized phenomenon focused on 
individual/household fortunes. This new understanding sees solutions to poverty in either the 
construction of entitlements on the basis of constitutional bills of rights and providing CCTs to 
households on a means-­‐tested basis (C. Ramirez 2008). Yet, as stated in this thesis introduction, 
poverty remains a function of the way states structure their macroeconomic policies, their 
bureaucratic institutions and their political systems, and not necessarily an individual condition 
needed to be fixed. As such, future research may want to seek political avenues to claim that 
social policy is, in fact, fundamentally a matter of economic policy. 	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i Formal welfare systems in Latin America have historically been characterized by the predominance of social 
insurance policies and by a weak or large absent social assistance sector (Mesa-Lago 1991, as cited Bastagli 2009), 
which implies that welfare benefits such as healthcare, pensions and education are dependent upon participation in 
the labor market. See Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare State Capitalism (2001) for a complete 
explanation of the corporatist welfare model. In this respect, Latin America has most closely followed the German 
tradition in structuring its social benefits and policies. 
ii In other words, 36 percent of the people who received the grant did not qualify, which combined with FHC’s quota 
system, meant that only some families could receive Bolsa Escola. This combination of quota requirements and 
decentralization made political favoritism practically unavoidable, particularly in small rural towns (Ansell 2011, 
25). 
iii Hall (2006) explains that “[t]he Lula government inherited a partially unified data base, or Cadastro Único, from 
the previous administration but this covered only 70 percent of poor families. This made effective implementation 
more difficult, leading to high implementation costs and targeting errors” (696).  
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ivAn employment subprogram (Empleo en Acción) and a youth worker training subprogram (Jovenes en Acción) and 
the family support subprogram (Familias en Acción).  Empleo en Accio ́n became a program of temporary 
employment for the poor in 78 main cities in the country and municipal capitals. The employment projects require 
intensive low-skilled labor and are performed in communities with very low standards of living. The subprogram 
had the short-term objective of raising income levels in these communities and the projects are administered by an 
NGO or a Worker's Cooperative Enterprise (EAT). On the other hand, the presidency also introduced Jóvenes en 
Acción which trains youth between 18 and 25 years of age, includes a stipend and takes place in the seven major 
cities in the country.  
v The report cites that the “[a]verage real annual GDP growth, which exceeded 5 percent between 1992 and 1995, 
dropped to barely half that rate in the three-year period 1996-1998, and economic activity declined by an estimated 5 
percent during 1999.”  
vi Legally speaking, the program was a governmental response to increasing trends in extreme poverty on a nation-
wide scope. The subprogram execution relied primarily on the regional and local offices of the Colombian Institute 
of Family Welfare (ICBF). The SSN program document (CO-0247 (IDB and Colombian Government 2000/2007)) 
establishes that the subprogram must sign an execution agreement as a condition prior to the first disbursement as 
well as the hiring for the necessary personnel (25). Familias en Acción also uses the records from the beneficiary 
identification and selection system (SISBEN) and other geographic criteria that target the localities with high levels 
of poverty (SSNP: 33). 
vii Myers and Dietz (2002) argue that Punto Fijo democrats in Venezuela used the prosperity of income from 
petroleum sales between 1973 and 1978 to offer generous rewards in exchange for support and preventing the rise of 
bureaucratic authoritarian dictatorships. 
viii Colombia did experience a military dictatorship between 1953-1957 under Colonel Rojas Pinilla, but it is usually 
considered a bureaucratic form of authoritarianism with no apparent lasting institutional inertia.   
ix  Three presidential candidates were assassinated in the 1989 presidential election. 
x Post-colonial theory denounces that the categorization, study and U.S.-based scholarship produced about Latin 
America and other world “regions” are problematic in their own right (Said 1978). Whether it is the vestiges of Cold 
War politics incentivizing increased funding for academic research and economic cooperation through the Alliance 
for Progress (Dezalay and Garth 2002), or contemporary depictions of the region that explain political change as the 
exclusive result of democratization processes or economic growth (Mesa-Lago 1994; Gill 2005; Segura-Ubiergo 
2007; Haggard and Kaufman 2008), conceptualizing Latin America as a coherent entity that can be studied, and thus 
dominated, raises important moral and epistemological challenges for this project. 
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xi See Abu-El-Haj and Chilcote (2011, 26) for a detailed account of the debates over income distribution in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. 
xii Indeed, institutions (i.e. CCT programs, Ministries and decentralized democracy) structured incentives for actors 
that could not be reduced to the social origins of the actors (i.e. the president or governors). To illustrate, Beck 
provides structural evidence for the inertia of these policy measures, such as the implications of a non-majoritarian 
political system: given that the number of effective parties represented in the lower house of the national legislature 
was larger than 5 in 2006 (9.3 Beck 2009,119) there was a low likelihood in the use of partisanship to obtain 
particular goods because of the high number of involved actors. Specifically, Beck writes:  
The loosely maintained coalition logic of governance means that the ideological or party-based 
ownership of policy ideas is less significant than in other countries with highly institutionalized 
and disciplined party systems with high party identificationxii. This dominant governing logic 
decreases the incentives of locally based actors not to cooperate and to give up desired local 
benefits out of fear of party-based punishment from above (2009, 119).  
xiii Contreras (2004) describes how the venezuelan technocracy was commonly refered to as the IESA-boys—in 
reference to the appointed misters who came from the Instituto de Estudios Superiores en Administración (Higher 
Studies in Amdministration Institute) and in parallel to the Chicago Boys and neoliberal reform in Chile in the 
19980s.  
xiv Penfold-Becerra notes that “it was only after collecting the signatures twice and having citizens verify their 
handwriting that the CNE concealed to hold the recall referendum by August 15, 2004” (Kornblith 2005, as cited in 
Penfold-Becerra 2007, 73).  
xv See Roberts (2006) for a discussion of the structural foundations of poverty in Latin America after Import 
Substitution Industrilization and exponential urban development. 
xvi These may be called “Extra-institutional”, or “Intra-institutional” structures, but it was a contested definition 
given the environment of political polarization at the time. Opponents viewed Chavismo as overriding constitutional 
law and the power of the state whereas supporters viewed it as a strategy to build democracy without the mediation 
of bureaucratic elites (Chacin 2009). 
xvii The first document (Conpes 3081), written in June 2000 authorized a foreign loan of $320 million (IDB-
1280/OC-CO and World Bank l-7050/CO accessible at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/10/02/000090341_20061002102909/Rend
ered/PDF/35614.pdf) and provided for 360 thousand families (see appendix B for the distribution of spending 
among organisms). The second document (Conpes 3359),written in June 2005, authorized a foreign loan of $85 
million to consolidate and extend the program in the 270 municipalities initially covered and its expansion to 
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marginal urban areas. The third CONPES document (3472), written in 2007, increased the number of target families 
to 1.5 million. In this stage the government decided to split the funding between the Colombian Institute of Family 
Welfare (ICBF), an administrative agency in charge of child protection, and foreign funds (Alviar Garcia 2011).  
APPENDIX A: 
Technical Difference between Brazilian and Colombian CCTs (Bastagli 2010) 
 Brazil (Bolsa Familia) Colombia (Familias en Accion) 
Motivation To fight poverty and promote the 
emancipation of the poor by: 
guaranteeing a minimum income; 
promoting access to and use of basic 
services; promoting the coordination of 
and synergies between government 
bodies (ministries) and levels (federal-
state-municipal). Preceded by a law 
regulating the Basic Citizen’s Income 
(L.10.835, 2004). Bolsa Familia 
consolidates four existing national cash 
transfer programmes targeting the poor. 
Its launch in 2003 led to the 
recertification of existing beneficiaries, 
the integration of new ones, the 
expansion of the average benefit 
amount and coverage, and significant 
institutional reorganization, with policy 
coordination awarded to a single unit in 
a single ministry and the adoption of 
detailed federal legislation regulating 
Bolsa Familia design and 
administration. 
FA’s main initial motivation was 
compensatory. Poor families adversely 
affected by the crisis were to be 
compensated with income support 
provided they sent their children to school 
and to regular health visits. The human 
capital accumulation objectives were thus 
initially secondary. This has changed as 
the programmed evolved and today FA’s 
main aim is to foster the accumulation of 
human capital. More specifically, today it 
aims to increase family expenditures on 
food, reduce school absence and drop-out 
rates (among primary and high school 
students), and increase health care 
provision for young children. Familias en 
Accion (FA) was initially launched in 
2000 to mitigate the adverse effects of 
macroeconomic shocks that hit Colombia 
in the second half of the 1990s. It was 
introduced as part of the Red de Apoyo 
Social, which included other two 
components: job creation and training 
programmes. 
Coverage and Cost Coverage: 11.2 million households 
(2006) 24 percent of total population 
Cost and Funding: 0.4 percent of GDP 
(2007) 
Coverage: 515,000 households (2005) 
5 percent of total population 
762 municipalities (out of 1,060) targets 
20 percent of the poorest households in 
towns with fewer than 100,000 people, 
adequate education and health structures, 
and a bank 
 
Cost and Funding: 
0.1percent of GDP (2005) 
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Target Population Two target groups: 
-All the extreme poor (defined as 
anyone with a declared per capita 
monthly income below ¼ the minimum 
wage) 
-All poor households (with a per capita 
monthly income below ½ the minimum 
wage) with children aged 0-15 (up to 
three) or pregnant women 
-in all municipalities 
Extreme poor households with children 
(0-17 years old) in selected municipalities 
with adequate infrastructure and fewer 
than 100,000 inhabitants. 
Coordination Ministry of Social Development (MSD) 
Overall coordination: Citizen’s Income 
Unit, MDS  
Overall supervision: National Council 
(comprises M&E: Monitoring and 
Evaluation Unit), MDS) 
Presidency 
Departamento Administrativo de la 
Presidencia de la Republica—Fondo de 
Inversion para la Paz is responsible for 
implementation of FA through the Unidad 
Coordinadora Nacional (UCN) 
Implementation 
and Actors 
Involved 
The MDS, states and municipalities 
signs terms of agreement regulating 
responsibilities for BF implementation. 
These are compulsory. 
States: responsible for monitoring 
overall state implementation and 
coordination. 
Municipalities: responsible for the 
registration of all poor households into 
the national single registry and for the 
monitoring of conditionality 
compliance in education and health. 
They are also required to set up social 
councils responsible for the overall 
monitoring of BF implementation at the 
municipal level. 
Service provision: the ministries of 
education and health are responsible for 
the provision of universal public 
education and health services through 
schools and health centers. 
Benefit payment: transfers are paid 
directly to beneficiary families from the 
CAIXA federal bank. 
The UCN coordinates with regional 
coordinating units and municipal liaison 
offices. 
Benefit payment is made through a local 
bank directly to the household. 
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Conditionality Education: children aged 6-15 to enrol 
in school and at least 85 percent 
frequency. 
Health: children aged 0-7 and pregnant 
and lactating women to 
undertake regular health visits, have 
vaccination booklets up-to-date 
and follow-up of children’s nutritional 
development. 
Education: children 7-18 attend no less 
than 80 percent of school classes 
Health: children<7yrs attend regular 
medical checkups 
Response to non-
compliance 
Five-step system (each consecutive 
episode of non-compliance must be 
registered within 18 months from 
the previous one for the system to move 
to the next step): 1. notification: first 
recorded non-compliance: beneficiary 
receives a notification, benefit is paid 
regularly; 2. benefit blocked: 2nd 
recorded non-compliance (within 18 
months from the first); 3. benefit 
suspended: 3rd recorded non-
compliance; 4. benefit suspended: 
4th recorded non-compliance; 5. benefit 
is cancelled, beneficiary household is 
taken off the programme. 
Households taken off BF can reapply 
(if still eligible) 6 months thereafter. 
Enrolment is monitored annually and 
enrolment certificate is required for 
children to benefit from school 
subsidy. 
Exit from CCT As long as eligibility criteria persist, 
beneficiaries are entitled to the Bolsa 
Família. Legislation mandates that 
beneficiary 
recertification must be carried out every 
two years to determine whether 
eligibility persists. 
Beneficiary households are automatically 
graduated out of the FA after 5 years. 
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